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ABSTRACT

A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE
SUCCESS OF NON-VIOLENT REVOLUTIONS

By
Nicholas P. Vucic
December 2010

Thesis supervised by Dr. Daniel Lieberfeld.
What enables some non-violent revolutions to succeed while others do not?
Examining Poland’s nonviolent revolution of 1989 and Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution in
2000 as case studies, this thesis analyzes the impact of certain factors on the success of
non-violent protests. This thesis argues that states are more likely to achieve revolution
through peaceful measures if these factors are present prior to revolution. In this
research, I examine the impact of these factors in Poland in 1989 and in Serbia in 2000.
Additionally, this comparative case study will generate hypotheses about the main factors
explaining the outcomes that can be investigated in other cases.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Research Overview
What enables some non-violent revolutions to succeed while others do not? In
1989, Poland experienced a successful peaceful political revolution led by the
independent trade union Solidarity in the face of repression attempts by the government
of Poland. Eleven years later, in 2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia led peaceful
protests that culminated in the overthrow of the Slobodan Milosevic regime and a nonviolent transition to democracy. This thesis is a comparison of the factors that impacted
the success of non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.
This research hopes to expand on the research of political scientist Kurt Schock,
which analyzes the underlying causes of successful non-violent revolutions, especially
with regard to discovering why some turn violent and others resolve peacefully either
through democratic elections, political liberalization, or the removal of an nondemocratic regime. In order to recognize the causes of success, the move towards a more
democratic political system, in non-violent revolutions, it is essential to explore the
existing theoretical explanations of success of non-violent movements and the critiques
of these theories. Schock explains that there are three factors that are important to the
success of non-violent protests: 1) a link between civil society institutions and the
challengers, 2) the level of decentralization in the structure of networks of oppositional
organizations, and 3) the levels1 of resilience, the ability to resist repression, and
leverage, the ability to mobilize support. According to Schock, each of these conditions
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is equally important to the success of non-violent movements and that the factors
influence one another.
Three terms that Schock utilizes in relation to his case studies are unarmed
insurrection, non-idealised non-violence, and pragmatic nonviolence. Schock uses
political scientist Stephen Zunes’s definition, which defines unarmed insurrections as
“organized popular challenges to government authority that depend primarily on methods
of non-violent action rather than on armed methods.”1 Additionally, Schock employs
political scientist Ralph Summy’s definition of non-idealised non-violence, which states,
“In its non-idealised form a nonviolent campaign may extend into other political
categories. Though remaining predominately nonviolent, it may contain some actions
that are conducted in the conventional sphere, and perhaps even lapse into the violent
sphere.”2 Schock then defines pragmatic non-violence as a “commitment to methods of
nonviolent action due to their perceived effectiveness, a view of means and ends as
potentially separable, a perception of the conflict as a struggle of incompatible interests,
an attempt to inflict nonphysical pressure on the opponent during the course of the
struggle to undermine the opponent’s power, and an absence of nonviolence as a way of
life.”3 These terms are important because Schock states that each of his case studies
qualifies as an “‘unarmed insurrection’, and as episodes of ‘non-idealised’ and
‘pragmatic’ nonviolent action.”4 Additionally, the two case studies for this research,
Poland and Serbia, also qualify as unarmed insurrections and episodes of non-idealised
and pragmatic nonviolence, which means that these two case studies can utilize a
1

Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2004. p. xvi.
2
Ibid., xvii.
3
Ibid., xvii.
4
Ibid., xxvi
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methodology similar to Schock’s, since these cases are comparable to his six case studies
in these aspects.
This thesis analyzes the impact on protest outcomes of variables including a link
between transnational civil society institutions and the challengers, opposition network
decentralization, and degree of leverage and resilience. In order to clarify what is meant
by each of the three factors, it is important to define the key terms present in each of the
factors, which for this research are “civil society,” “non-governmental organizations,”
“challengers,” “leverage,” and “resilience.” In order to enhance comprehension of the
concepts and factors that will be presented in this thesis, it is important to define the key
terms. In a report titled Open Government Fostering Dialogue with Civil Society written
by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), civil society
is defined as
non-profit and non-governmental organisations, organised by groups of
people in the sphere of civil society, working for a cause for the benefit of
society, that very often contribute as well to the development of
democracy. There are, however, grey areas in this definition,
organisational forms, such as political parties and liberation movements
that, on the one hand, spring from civil society and, on the other, may end
by assuming government responsibility.5
Schock defines challengers as “ordinary citizens engaged in methods of nonviolent
action,” which are independent from the state and come “from any and all classes and
castes” that are not required to hold any particular “ideological, religious, or metaphysical
beliefs.” Political scientist Leslie R Alm states “a non-governmental organization is
defined as a ‘scientific, professional, business, non-profit, or public interest organization
or association, which is neither affiliated with, nor under the direction of a

5

Open Government: Fostering Dialogue with Civil Society. Paris: Oecd, 2003. p. 191.
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government.’”6 Additionally, Schock identifies leverage as the “ability of contentious
actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke pressure against
them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their power.”7
Furthermore, Schock defines resilience as “the capacity of contentious actors to continue
to mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or
inhibiting their activities.”8
In addition to “civil society,” “political repression” and two relevant terms,
“political liberalization” and “reform,” are key concepts for this research, because they
are practical terms in the measurement of success for each non-violent movement.
Political scientist Bret Lee Billet defines political repression as
actions taken by political authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a
perceived threat to the security and stability of the government, the
regime, or the state itself. They include acts of censorship against the
mass media and political publications, and the like, as well as restrictions
on the political activity and participation of the general public, or specific
persons, parties, and organizations.9
This research will use the definition of “political liberalization” developed by
political scientists Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence
Whitehead. O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead define political liberalization as
“making effective rights that protect individuals and groups from arbitrary, repressive, or

6

Alm, Leslie R. "Is Spotlighting Enough? Environmental NGOs and the Commision for Environmental
Cooperation. " Canadian - American Public Policy 67 (2006): 1-46. ProQuest Military
Collection, ProQuest. Web. 9 Apr. 2010.
7
Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2004. Pp. 142 -143.
8
Ibid., 142.
9
Billet, Bret Lee. Investment Behavior of Multinational Corporations in Developing Areas: Comparing the
Development Assistance Committee, Japanese, and American Corporations. New Brunswick: Transaction
Publishers, 1991. p. 31
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illegal acts committed by a communist or authoritarian state.”10 According to political
scientist Michael Bratton, “the release of political prisoners, the lifting of government
censorship, and the legalization of banned political parties,” are some recognizable
examples of what constitutes political liberalization.11 Additionally, political scientist
John Keeler defines “reform” as “a policy innovation manifesting an unusually
substantial redirection or reinforcement of previous public policy.”12 Finally, it is
important for this research to define what is meant by the dependent variable of
“success.” For the purpose of this research, success is defined as achieving the deposal of
a non-democratic regime and the beginning of a move towards a more democratic
political system.
Schock analyzes six cases of non-violent movements in order to discover what
factors enable non-violent movements to become successful. Schock examines the
success of the non-violent movements in South Africa and the Philippines of the mid1980s, the failure of non-violent movements in Burma and China in the late 1980s, and
the success of the non-violent movements in Nepal and Thailand of the early 1990s.
Schock examines the structure of the opposition movement, the ability of the opposition
movement to connect with civil society organizations, and the level of resilience and
leverage of each movement. From this analysis, Schock concludes that a decentralized
opposition network aided the non-violent movement in persisting through repression
attempts by the government. Additionally, Schock resolved that a link between civil
10

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. Transitions from Authoritarian
Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
11
Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van De Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in
Comparative Perspective (Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics). New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1997.
12
Keeler, John. "Opening the Window for Reform: Mandates,." Comparative Political Studies 25.4
(1993): 433-486. Comparative Political Studies. Web. 7 Dec. 2009.
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society and the opposition movement also strengthened the ability of non-violent
movements to succeed, because the heightened amounts of participation, resources, and
media attention were able to enhance support for the movement. Furthermore, Schock
concluded that opposition movements that had higher levels of resilience and leverage
proved more successful than those with weaker levels of resilience and leverage. An
important aspect of Schock’s research on these three factors is that there are various
points where these factors overlap and interact with one another. An example of this is
that a decentralized leadership structure in the opposition movement contributes to the
resilience of a non-violent movement. This research will utilize these concepts to explain
how these factors impact the success of non-violent movements in the cases of Poland
and Serbia.
1.2 Thesis Structure
This thesis is divided into six chapters. The first chapter supplies an introduction
into the research question, the research hypotheses, the methodology that will test these
hypotheses, and this thesis’s contribution to research. Chapter two provides a review of
the literature on non-violent action and the scholarly debate on the value of non-violent
action in the contemporary international political climate. Chapter three analyzes the
impact of civil society in Poland and Serbia and their ability to connect with the
challengers of the state. Chapter four provides an examination into the structure of the
opposition networks present in Poland and Serbia and their consequential ability to resist
governmental repression attempts. Chapter five explores the levels of resilience and
leverage of the opposition movements in Poland and Serbia. Chapter six presents the
conclusions of this study focusing on the impact of Schock’s three factors discussed in
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Chapters 3 - 5 on the success of non-violent action in Serbia and Poland, along with
providing additional recommendations and hypotheses for future research.
1.3 Thesis Hypotheses and Purpose of Research
In order to discover whether or not the presence of a link between civil society
and the challengers, a decentralized opposition network, leverage, and resilience creates
the conditions necessary for peaceful revolutions to succeed, there are three principal
research hypotheses that need to be explored. The primary research hypothesis (H1) is
that in comparing countries, those that have the presence of a link between civil-society
institutions and oppressed citizens enable the conditions necessary for the success of nonviolent action. The second hypothesis (H2) is that in comparing countries, those that
organize a decentralized network of oppositional institutions are more likely to achieve
peaceful political transition. The third hypothesis (H3) is that in comparing countries,
movements that have greater resilience and leverage are more likely to accomplish
success through non-violent action.
The goal of this research is to continue the development of a framework of the
factors that enable the success of non-violent action in non-democracies that could
provide additional hypotheses for testing. This research also hopes to contribute to the
literature on the subject of how non-violent action can succeed in challenging nondemocracies. Following Schock’s study, this research examines cases that fall within the
third wave of democratization, which could help assess the extent that the factors that
enable the success of non-violent action for these modern cases fit within the general
spectrum of cases from all three waves. The research of contemporary cases, such as
Poland and Serbia, investigates how factors that impact their success compare and
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contrast with factors that had impacted the success of non-violent movements
historically.
1.4 Research Methodology
Aspects of the methodology for this research project that require further
clarification are case study selection, research design, strategy to accumulate data that is
relevant to this research, operationalization and classification of variables and terms, the
establishment of reliability and validity, and the uses of the findings in future instances.
As mentioned in the introduction the two cases that are used in this research project are
Serbia and Poland, which will act as cases that will help explain how a country can
experience a peaceful revolution. The two cases, Serbia and Poland, were selected due to
their political, social, demographic differences, and successful non-violent revolutionary
outcomes. These two cases were selected primarily due to different pre-revolution
characteristics that existed in those societies, but experienced a similar set of
consequences, which follows Mill’s method of differences. This research will test these
two cases to discover what characteristics the movements shared and to what extent they
contributed to the success of the movement. Furthermore, this research will attempt to
determine whether or not Schock’s explanation of the factors that enable success in nonviolent action apply to Poland and Serbia. What this means is that this thesis will test
Schock’s three factors in two cases that were not explored in Unarmed Insurrections and
attempt to determine if Schock was correct or if there are parts of his theory that do not
apply to these cases. This study is limited by resource and time considerations, therefore
further research in the cases and factors is necessary. Additionally, this research analyzes
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two cases through a cross-national comparison that may provide insight that could go
unnoticed in a larger-n quantitative study.
This research analyzes the cases of Serbia and Poland during their non-violent
revolutionary movements in the context of Schock’s three factors that enable success for
non-violent movements. In order to discover the impact of these three factors on the two
case studies, this research will examine major non-violent action campaigns and events in
each case during the revolutionary period. This thesis will describe the event, the date,
the location, the method of non-violence, the participation numbers, participation of third
parties, and the leaders/organizers of the event. This research will find this data through
examinations of primary and secondary sources consisting of periodicals, academic
journals, government records, non-governmental organization records, books, and
archived event flyers.
In order to discover the impact of a link between civil society organizations and
the challengers, this study will explore the sources to determine major campaigns and
events in Poland and Serbia. Once the major campaigns and events are recognized, this
study will attempt to obtain the level of non-governmental organizations involved in the
non-violent protests and which groups and/or individuals organized and led the events.
By finding the level of involvement of civil society institutions in the non-violent events,
this thesis can determine whether or not civil society organizations were active in the
movement and to what extent. If it appears that barely any third party institutions
participated in the campaigns and events, then it could be determined that a link between
civil society institutions and the challengers did not exist. Conversely, if the research
reveals that multiple civil society organizations were active in a variety of protests, then it
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means that these third party institutions were closely connected with the movement.
Additionally, by discovering the leaders and organizers of an event or campaign, a more
in-depth analysis of the role and impact of third party institutions could be revealed. This
is possible, since the civil society institutions could either be at the forefront of the
movement, or simply in the background as non-active participants. If it is determined
that civil society organizations led and/or organized a large portion of the events, then a
link between civil society and the challengers becomes more apparent.
The second factor, the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the
opposition network, is determined through an analysis of the events to discover what
groups and or individuals organized and led the events. If it appears that a diverse
amount of groups and individuals were at the head of the movement, then it is possible to
derive that the movement had a decentralized leadership structure. If a variety of groups
and/or individuals led the events and campaigns that would signify that the leadership of
the movement is not coming from an individual leader in a hierarchical structure. In
addition to analyzing the leadership of major events and campaign, this study will also
examine primary and secondary sources that discuss the structure of the movement.
Several scholars have already explored the leadership structures in the non-violent
movements in Poland and Serbia, so this research will also use these sources to help
determine whether the movement’s leadership structure was decentralized.
The third factor, the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent opposition
movement, is measurable through an examination of three characteristics of the major
campaigns and events of the movements. The three characteristics that this thesis will
explore to determine the leverage and resiliency of a movement are the location where
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the event is held, the non-violent method utilized at the event, and the numbers of
participants in the event. The location of the event is important, because it can show the
ability of the movement to mobilize support throughout the country, which signifies that
the more locations that events are held, the greater the leverage ability is in a movement.
Additionally, the method of non-violent action can help determine the leverage and
resilience capacity of a movement, because it displays the ability of a movement to
innovate and develop strategies that make it more difficult for the regime to repress. If a
movement implements a diverse variety of methods, the leverage ability increases, since
more people are able to participate due to the likelihood that non-violent techniques are
more easily employed by a greater variety of people. Furthermore, the implementation of
a variety of non-violent methods increases the resilience capability of the opposition
movement since the regime would be unable to target a specific technique or action to
prohibit. The participation numbers of an event help to determine the leverage ability of
a movement since the more people at an event signifies that the movement has the ability
to mobilize high numbers of participants. Additionally, the greater amount of
participants at an event means that the regime is less capable of repressing the movement;
since the regime would not have the resources to successful repress that number of
people. In other words, it is easier for the regime to repress a few hundred protesters as
compared to a few thousand protestors.
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Chapter 2: Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
What factors enable success in cases of non-violent action? Scholars present a
variety of theories on factors that enable success in non-violent revolutions. This chapter
explores the three factors that enable success in non-violent movements as described by
political scientist Kurt Schock and what other scholars believe about each factor.
The chapter begins with how scholars have defined non-violent action. The next
three sections discuss Schock’s theories regarding the role of civil-society institutions, the
structural composition of the opposition network, and the leverage and resilience abilities
of the opposition network in the success of non-violent movements. The chapter
concludes with an assessment of the areas of the literature that are limited in their
description of the factors that enable success for non-violent action and how the literature
reviewed relates to this thesis.
2.2 Non-violent Action
With an increase in non-violent movements internationally, the debates between
various schools of thought has also increased, creating a variety of a discussion on
multiple aspects and characteristics of non-violent action. A comprehensive definition of
non-violent action is provided by Schock in Unarmed Insurrections, which draws on
political scientists Ronald M. McCarthy, Douglas G. Bond, and Gene Sharp. Schock
compiles a variety of existing definitions to define non-violent action as action that
involves activity in the collective pursuit of social or political objectives.
More specifically, nonviolent action involves an active process of bringing
political, economic, social, emotional, or moral pressure to bear in the
wielding of power in contentious interactions between collective actors
(McCarthy 1990, 1997; Sharp 1973, 1990, 1999). Nonviolent
12

action…operates outside the bounds of institutionalized political channels
(Bond 1994). Nonviolent action occurs through (1) acts of omission,
whereby people refuse to perform acts expected by norms, custom, law, or
decree; (2) acts of commission, whereby people perform acts that they do
not usually perform, are not expected by norms or customs to perform, or
are forbidden by law, regulation or decree to perform; or (3) a
combination of acts of omission and commission (Sharp 1973). Rather
than being viewed as half of a rigid violent-nonviolent dichotomy,
nonviolent action may be better understood as a set of methods with
special features that are different from those of both violent resistance and
institutional politics (McCarthy 1990).13
In addition to the inclusive definition provided by Schock, this thesis will use a more
concise definition of non-violent action. For the purpose of this study, non-violent action
is defined as the use of methods that do not utilize violence in order to place pressure on
the target to achieve political, social, or economic goals. Additionally, this study breaks
non-violent action down into the three categories of non-violent methods described by
Sharp: protest and persuasion, methods of noncooperation, and methods of non-violent
intervention. This thesis utilizes Schock’s summary of Sharp’s three categories of nonviolent methods to categorize the different types of non-violent action, which states
Methods of protest and persuasion are used to reveal a problem, illustrate
the extent of dissatisfaction, rouse public support or the support of third
parties, overcome fear and acquiescence, and expose the state’s
illegitimacy. They include methods such as protest demonstrations,
marches, rallies, public speeches, declarations, the collective display of
symbols, and vigils. Methods of noncooperation are used to disrupt the
status quo and undermine the state’s power, resources, and legitimacy.
They include methods such as boycotts, strikes, open refusal to pay taxes
or enter the military, and other forms of civil disobedience. Methods of
nonviolent intervention are used to disrupt attempts at continued
subjugation. They include methods such as sit-ins, nonviolent sabotage,
pickets, blockades, hunger strikes, land occupations, and the development
of parallel or alternative institutions.14

13

Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2004. p. 6
14
Ibid., p. 16.
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Sharp’s three categories of non-violent methods are useful for this thesis to help
differentiate between the types of non-violent action used and the intent behind using
different non-violent methods. For example, the American civil rights movement
employed a variety of non-violent methods, such as sit-ins, marches, and boycotts, which
were intended to disrupt continued oppression, expose the state’s illegitimacy, and
disrupt the status quo, respectively.
2.3 The Politics of Nonviolent Action
In 1973, Sharp wrote The Politics of Nonviolent Action, which attempted to
explain how non-institutional actions and non-violent methods could drive political
transition. This groundbreaking work analyzed examples of non-violent political
transition, developed the concept of pragmatic non-violence, as spiritual non-violence
was the prominent concept at the time, and explained the means that cause non-violent
movements to generate political transition. Sharp’s non-violent-action theory asserts
when people refuse their cooperation, withhold their help, and persist in
their disobedience and defiance, they are denying their opponent the basic
human assistance and cooperation which any government or hierarchal
system requires. If they do this in sufficient numbers for long enough, that
government or hierarchical system will no longer have power.15
Sharp’s analysis centers on the balance of power between the government and the
people, since the government’s power originates from the obedience and cooperation of
the people. Once the people become disobedient and stop cooperating with the
government’s desires, then it can no longer effectively govern those people. Sharp
contends

15

Sharp, Gene. Power and Struggle (Politics of Nonviolent Action, Part 1). Boston: Porter Sargent
Publishers, 1973. p. 65.
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if the subjects deny the ruler’s right to rule and to command, they are
withdrawing the general agreement or group consent, which makes
possible the existing government. This loss of authority sets in motion the
disintegration of the ruler’s power. That power is reduced to the degree
that he is denied authority. Where the loss is extreme, the existence of that
particular government is threatened. 16
Sharp adds that non-violent action shifts the balance of power in favor of the people
making the government unable to rule, “regardless of its coerciveness or brutality,”17
because further repression only exacerbates the situation, as opposed to philosopher
Niccolò Machiavelli, who believed cruelty could marginalize any opposition through
submission.18
With an advantage in the power relations, political transition is produced through
one of four mechanisms of change, which Sharp identifies as conversion,
accommodation, nonviolent coercion, and disintegration. Conversion occurs when “the
government…adopts the challenger’s point of view and concedes to its goals.”19
Accommodation happens when “the government grants concessions to the challengers
even though it is not converted to the challengers’ point of view, is not forced to concede
by the challengers’ actions, and has the capacity to continue the struggle.”20 Sharp states
that nonviolent coercion, which is change that is “achieved against the government’s will
as a result of the challengers’ successful undermining of the government’s power,
legitimacy, and ability to control the situation through methods of nonviolent action” is
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typically the most successful mechanism of change in non-democracies.21 Sharp defines
disintegration as “when the government breaks down in the face of widespread
nonviolent action.”22 These mechanisms of change are important for this research since
they help explain the ways non-violent action could produce political transitions, which
introduce a framework that helps explain why some non-violent movements succeed.
Sharp’s four mechanisms of change explain how political change occurs when nonviolent action is used, which helps identify the process that Schock’s three factors enable
success in non-violent action.
Some scholars present theories that contend that the non-violent action theory is
limited in its explanation of the structural aspect of political transition, especially
regarding the impact of political opportunities. For example, sociologist David S. Meyer
argues that “ongoing interactions between challengers and the world around them
determine not only the immediate outcomes of a social movement, but also its
development and potential influence over time.”23 In other words, changes in the
political landscape, such as elections and economic crises, can open or close political
opportunities for the opposition networks. The significance of this criticism is that
although neither theory claims to completely explain all aspects of non-violent action
individually, it is important to utilize concepts from each to develop a more
comprehensive theoretical framework. Sharp’s conclusions are limited by minimizing the
impact of structural considerations, such as the impact of different administrations or
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upcoming elections. On the other hand, the non-violent-action approach’s attention to
methods and mechanisms and movement outcomes provides a solid foundation, as it
explains the role of certain factors and their influence on political change, which Schock
expands upon.
2.4 Civil-Society’s Role in Non-violent Action
The principal assertion of Schock’s Unarmed Insurrections is that three factors
enable success in non-violent movements. This section discusses Schock’s first factor,
the role of the link between civil-society organizations, primarily transnational
institutions, such as Amnesty International and Freedom House, and the challengers of
the regime, such as the Indian people led by Gandhi. Schock states “the global processes
that intensified at the end of the twentieth century created networks linking oppressed and
intermediary groups, thereby increasing the potential for challengers to invoke the
support of third parties [civil-society institutions].” Furthermore, Schock asserts “the
support of challengers by third parties may be crucial in providing them [challengers]
with greater leverage or in tipping the balance of power in their [challengers] favor”
which signifies that “nonviolent action by the oppressed [challengers] may have a greater
likelihood of succeeding where these networks are involved.”24
This means that domestic and international civil-society institutions provide
opposition movements with financial and material resources, media coverage, and
general support that help strengthen the protest and resistance abilities of the movement,
making the non-violent action more likely to succeed. Domestic NGO’s are civil-society
institutions that develop and operate in the country of the conflict, whereas international
24
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NGO’s are civil-society institutions that are headquartered in countries outside of the one
where the conflict is occurring. Third parties refer primarily to international or domestic
organizations independent of government influence and/or support, such as civil-society
institutions like international rights organizations, labor unions, and political parties.
Schock concludes that the introduction of civil-society organizations into non-violent
movements strengthens the capabilities of the opposition network to not only resist
repression efforts by the regime, but also to more easily organize and protest.25 As a
result of a stronger opposition network, with increased funding, support, and operational
capacity due to the inclusion of civil-society institutions, the potential for the success of
the non-violent action increases.26
According to Schock, the informal alliance between civil-society institutions and
the challengers in a non-violent movement can transform multiple aspects of the
movement, especially the movement’s potential success. Schock contends that the
influence and power of domestic and transnational civil-society institutions is used to
attract international attention that pressures the regime to resolve the conflict or topples
the regime. Since non-governmental organizations already have formal institutions and a
supply of resources, such as funds, contacts, leaders, and access to the media, it is easier
for these civil-society institutions to provide the movement with access to these
resources. Schock states that the addition of these organizations into the movement
makes the movement instantly stronger, with improved capacity to resist repression and
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mobilize support, as the movement gains experience and access to greater resources from
the non-governmental organizations.27
Both domestic and transnational civil-society institutions connected to challengers
can have a deep impact on the success of that movement. Transnational civil-society
organizations usually become interested in non-violent action due to some aspect of the
movement that relates to their philosophy and/or objectives. These groups often include
global human-rights organizations, such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, but also typically include other political groups, such as the Open Society
Institute, economic groups, such as the Aurora Foundation, social groups, like the Red
Star Belgrade fans, cultural groups, such as POLCUL, environmental organizations, such
as Greenpeace, and religious rights groups, such as Lutheran World Relief. The
inclusion of a variety of civil-society organizations means that the movement can
implement strategies that they would not have previously considered. Conversely,
domestic civil-society institutions develop primarily for social, non-conflictive reasons,
but governmental repression can create a large number of these groups or increase the
power and support of the pre-existing groups, because during repression, societal
consciousness is raised and participation in civil-society institutions increases.28 Although
the domestic civil-society institutions typically lack movement experience, knowledge,
and resources, they are able to provide resources to the movement that transnational civilsociety organizations cannot.
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Schock explains that the most important benefit of establishing a link between
civil-society institutions and the challengers in a state is that it provides the movement
with greater leverage and resiliency abilities, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5,
which help to shift the balance of power in the relationship between challengers and the
regime.29 This shift in the power relationship is especially important in context of the
obedient and cooperative relationship that the people have with the regime, since once the
people stop obeying and cooperating with the regime, the regime loses its ability to
govern.30
Prior to testing whether the link between civil-society institutions and the
challengers enabled success in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and
Serbia, I will summarize Schock’s own findings on his six cases to better understand how
civil-society institutions could impact a movement. In South Africa, Schock discovers
that the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Congress of South African Trade
Unions (COSATU) coordinated a variety of other civil-society institutions, like the
National Education Crisis Committee, which was designed to teach people about the
current situation, and helped transfer power to the challengers.31 Similarly, two civilsociety institutions in the Philippines, the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) and the
United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO) organized the other civil-society groups to fight
against the Marcos regime. As a result of the link between civil-society institutions and
the challengers in the Philippines, the non-violent movement was able to effectively
implement a variety of non-violent methods, such as economic boycotts and
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transportation strikes, innovate their strategy when necessary, and mobilize even more
people and resources to the anti-Marcos cause.
In the other two successful instances of non-violent action, Thailand and Nepal,
Schock credits civil-society institutions with overcoming differences and working
together with the challengers to enhance the capability of movements to efficiently
pressure the regimes to transition to a more democratic government.32 Conversely, in
Burma and China, Schock cites the lack of an active domestic civil-society and the
isolation of both countries in preventing transnational civil-society institutions from
working with the challengers as part of the reason that both cases ultimately proved
unsuccessful.33
A link existed between international and domestic civil-society institutions in the
four successful non-violent movements Schock studied, but did not exist in the
unsuccessful non-violent movements in Burma and China. In the successful cases, a link
between civil-society institutions and the challengers helped supply the pro-democracy
movements with greater resources, additional leadership, and international attention,
which aided in the movements’ success.
The Boomerang Pattern developed by political scientists Margaret E. Keck and
Kathryn Sikkink supports Schock’s concept that a link between civil-society
organizations and the challengers enables success in non-violent action. Keck and
Sikkink developed a model (Appendix 5) that explains how transnational advocacy
networks (TANs), which are networks of protesters and transnational non-government
organizations, work together to surmount repression attempts by the state. In the
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Boomerang Pattern, International Non-governmental organizations (INGOs) aid
challengers in an oppressive state by circumventing the blockage by using their
international support and resources to pressure other states and the repressive state to
produce positive political change.34 The Boomerang Pattern is a prime example of how
third party institutions act to strengthen and support opposition movements, in order to
produce political change, which could include regime transition. For example, Keck and
Sikkink cite the case of the rubber tappers in the Amazon region of Brazil, who
successfully implored the National Council of Rubber Tappers, the Catholic Church, and
U.S. environmentalists to use their resources and power to place pressure on the Brazilian
government to stop encroachment by cattle ranchers.35
2.5 Decentralized Leadership Structure in Non-violent Movements
This section discusses Schock’s second factor that enables success for nonviolent action: the importance of a decentralized leadership structure in the opposition
network. In addition to exploring the role of transnational civil-society institutions in
non-violent movements, Schock asserts that movements are more likely to succeed
through peaceful means if the opposition network challenging the regime has a
decentralized structure. A decentralized opposition network structure means that the
challenging movement of activists and non-governmental agencies cooperate to form a
network that leads as a whole, as opposed to a centralized structure in which leadership
comes from an individual or a single organization. Schock contends that a decentralized
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network is more able to resist governmental repression, predominantly as a result of
preventing the regime from targeting a specific individual or organization for repression.
The organizational structure of the opposition network in a non-violent movement
can affect numerous aspects of the ability of non-violent action to succeed. In Unarmed
Insurrections, Schock explains that “decentralized, yet coordinated organizational
networks” enhance the ability of the movement to resist repression and increase
operational capacity, which increases the potential for the non-violent action to
accomplish its objectives.36 Additionally, Schock asserts that
A decentralized challenge, however, requires a significant degree of
coordination and aggregation. Umbrella organizations or federative
structures are useful in this regard, as they may facilitate the brokering of
diverse groups, promote the flow of information and the aggregation of
resources, coordinate local networks and struggles into national political
challenges, and magnify the resources and power of a challenge.
Umbrella organizations or federative structures also facilitate the forging
of broad alliances of diverse groups that are necessary for effective
campaigns of protest and noncooperation.37
What Schock means is that an umbrella organization or a federation of the political
opposition allows the movement to act through coordinated measures, which means that
the distribution of resources, the delegation of duties, and the spread of information are
made easier. These tasks are made easier because the umbrella organization or federation
has standardized methods and processes already in place and the other members of the
opposition movement follow these standards and process, streamlining the ability of the
movement to carry out these duties.
Schock explains that a decentralized structure in a non-violent movement helps
the network resist repression for five main reasons. Because of the nature of
36
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decentralized leadership in the network, states are less able to focus repression efforts on
individual groups and/or leaders. Additionally, Schock contends that “the devolution of
leadership inhibits the disruption of movement activities when movement leaders are
imprisoned or murdered,” which means that the opposition movement can continue their
non-violent action without having to completely recuperate.38 Furthermore, Schock
contends that as a result of the inclusion of numerous organizations and individuals,
decentralized networks are typically more democratic, ensuring that every institution or
individual has a voice in the direction of the movement. Another benefit of a
decentralized structure in an opposition network is that it allows for the development of a
common goal, which helps to minimize conflict between diverse organizations and
individuals. Lastly, Schock claims that decentralized networks are organized in a manner
that enhances “flexibility and the capacity for horizontal information flow,” which
permits the movement to innovate strategically and implement a greater variety of
methods more easily than “more bureaucratically structured and ideologically rigid”
movements.39 Additionally, the decentralization of the opposition network allows for
peaceful resolutions when conflicts arise between network leaders and/or organizations.
The democratic nature of decentralized leadership signifies that when conflicts among
leaders and/ors organizations happen that the entire organization or movement works
towards the resolution of the issue.
Schock concluded that decentralized leadership benefits the resilience of a
movement by examining the organization of opposition networks in South Africa, the
Philippines, Nepal, Thailand, Burma and China. In South Africa, Schock discovered that
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the United Democratic Front (UDF), coordinated several opposition movements at a local
level to develop a nationwide movement. This signifies that the UDF created a
nationwide anti-apartheid movement by simply managing a variety of local opposition
networks, which made it difficult for the regime to repress the movement, since it was
divided among multiple organizations.40 The movements in the Philippines and Thailand
both had groups, Bayan and the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) respectively;
act as nationwide umbrella organizations that were each able to consolidate diverse
institutions into a single collective opposition movement.41 In Nepal, the non-violent
movement formed a federation of political opposition institutions that worked together to
produce political transition. These four instances of decentralized structure in nonviolent movements showed that distributed leadership provided numerous advantages
that increased the potential for the success of the non-violent action.42 Conversely, the
non-violent action in Burma and China lacked an organized, but decentralized structure
in the opposition network, which allowed for the regimes to efficiently repress individual
movements, organizations, and activists.43
Relevant to Schock’s analysis of decentralized networks in non-violent
movements and the consequential impact on their outcomes is Keck and Sikkink’s
Boomerang Model, discussed in last section. An important aspect of the Boomerang
Model is that the transnational protests are not led by a single group or individual, but
typically by Transnational Advocacy Networks, which consist of individuals, non-
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governmental organizations, and sometimes other states.44 This implies that non-violent
movements supported by non-governmental organizations are more likely to have
decentralized leadership within the network, since there are multiple organizations
participating in the movement. For example, the rubber tappers in the Amazon case
displayed a decentralized TAN that consisted of the local rubber tappers, the National
Council of Rubber Tappers, other local and international labor unions, the Catholic
Church, and American environmentalists, all of which shared leadership responsibilities
for the movement.45 In line with Schock’s theory, Keck and Sikkink attribute the success
of transnational protests to the ability of TANs to organize and to apply pressure on the
restrictive state from outside the domestic arena. Additionally, it is important to note that
in cases of successful non-violent action that although a particular organization or
individual may initiate the movement, the leadership typically becomes more
decentralized with the addition of other individuals and organizations. The leadership of
the opposition network undergoes decentralization as a result of the tendency of nonviolent movements to be more democratic in nature, which signifies that new members to
the opposition network are given the opportunity to influence the direction of the
movement.
2.6 Leverage and Resilience in Non-violent Revolutions
The third factor that Schock presents that enables success in non-violent
revolutions is the leverage and resilience abilities of the movement. As mentioned in the
first chapter, leverage is the “ability of contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of
44
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support from opponents or invoke pressure against them through the networks upon
which opponents depend for their power.”46 Schock describes resilience as the ability of
non-violent movements to persist in the face of consistent repression efforts by the
restrictive regime. These concepts relay the importance of the balance of power in the
relationship between the regime and the citizens in a state, because a more vulnerable
regime pressured by opposition networks with raised leverage and resilience capabilities
is more likely to enable success.
“The probability that an unarmed insurrection will tip the balance of power in
favor of the challengers is a function of its leverage and resilience,” states Schock,
regarding the impact of leverage and resilience on the success of non-violent action.47
Schock contends that leverage and resilience directly influence the power relationship
between the government and the opposition network, with the ability to shift power to
either party. Schock’s principal assertion is that if a movement has enhanced leverage
and resilience capabilities, non-violent action is more likely to succeed, since the
opposition network is capable of withdrawing support of the regime making it unable to
effectively operate.
One of the two concepts that comprises Schock’s third factor that enables success
in non-violent movements is the concept of leverage. This “refers to the ability of
contentious actors to mobilize the withdrawal of support from opponents or invoke
pressure against them through the networks upon which opponents depend for their
power.”48 This signifies that if a pro-democracy movement mobilizes or withdraws
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support from the government, especially from international and domestic civil-society
institutions, the balance of power can shift in favor of the opposition network. The shift
in the balance of power between the government and the pro-democracy movement
enables the opposition network to slow or halt government operations, as the government
is not able to rule without the obedience and cooperation of its citizens.
The second concept of Schock’s third factor that enables success in non-violent
movements is resilience, which “refers to the capacity of contentious actors to continue to
mobilize collective action despite the actions of opponents aimed at constraining or
inhibiting their activities.” This concept emphasizes the ability of a non-violent
movement to overcome repression attempts by the government, which acts to “tip the
balance of power in favor of the challengers.” The resilience of a non-violent movement
is directly related to its leverage capabilities, as Schock states “the more resilient a
challenge, the greater the likelihood that it will be able to mobilize the withdrawal of
support or generate pressure against the state through networks upon which the state
depends for its resources and legitimacy.”49 One factor that can influence the resiliency
of a non-violent movement, discussed in Chapter 4, is the level of decentralization in the
leadership structure of the opposition network. Decentralized leadership in a non-violent
movement signifies that the government is unable to target a specific individual or
organization, which also means that the opposition network is able to continue normal
operations when leaders are imprisoned or assassinated. This signifies that Schock’s
second factor, the ability of an opposition network to decentralize its leadership, directly
influences the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement.
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In addition to the level of decentralization of the opposition network, the ability to
implement multiple non-violent techniques from across the three methods of non-violent
action, the ability to implement methods of dispersion as well as methods of
concentration, and tactical innovation are also factors that affect the leverage and
resilience abilities of a non-violent movement. Schock claims “the implementation of a
diverse range of actions across the various methods of non-violent action diffuses the
state’s repression, thereby lessening its effectiveness.” Furthermore, “incorporating
multiple methods of non-violent action also makes it easier for the challengers to shift the
emphasis from one set of methods to another when the state focuses its repressive
capacities on a particular set of actions.” Additionally, the ability to shift between
methods of dispersion and methods of concentration means that the government is unable
to focus its police and military forces on a certain event or place, as the opposition
network could mobilize its people in at a different event or place. The ability of a nonviolent movement to shift its resources and people from one event and place to another
means that not only does it help limit the effect of the repression attempts by the
government, but the government’s power is weakened since its resources are exhausted
trying to repress these protests in a variety of locations. The ability of an opposition
network to tactically innovate “keeps the authorities off balance and prevent the
challenge from stagnating” by not allowing the state to adapt to and counter certain
methods.50
In order to understand the impact of leverage and resilience on the success of the
non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, I will examine Schock’s findings regarding
the relationship between the leverage and resilience abilities in his six cases and the
50
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potential success of the six movements. Schock determined that in South Africa, the nonviolent movement, primarily led by the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), enhanced its leverage and
resilience capacity through the utilization of a decentralized leadership structure, the
employment of “a wide range of actions across the three methods of nonviolent action,”
and the implementation of methods of dispersion and concentration. The improved
leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent movement in South Africa “stripped
the regime of legitimacy, contributed to the condemnation of the apartheid regime by
third parties, and triggered increased international sanctions.”51 In the Philippines,
Schock found that Bayan used a “range of methods” and “responded innovatively to
government repression,” along with the implementation of a method of dispersion called
the welgang bayan, resulted in enhanced resilience and leverage abilities that contributed
to the success of the non-violent action.52
In Nepal, the non-violent movements increased its resilience and leverage
capabilities by utilizing “a range of actions across the three methods of nonviolent
action” and “innovatively responded to government repression through techniques such
as blackouts and lightning demonstrations,” which contributed to the undermining of the
state’s “resources, legitimacy, and ability to rule” that “were effective in overthrowing
the regime.”53 Similarly, Schock discovered that the leverage and resilience capacity of
the non-violent movement in Thailand was boosted by a “decentralized leadership
structure and tactical innovation,” which contributed to the success of the non-violent

51

Ibid., pp. 145-146.
Ibid., p. 146.
53
Ibid., pp. 146-147.
52

30

action.54 Conversely, the non-violent movements in Burma and China failed to
implement a range of non-violent actions, methods of dispersion and concentration, and a
decentralized leadership structure. Consequently, the two movements were unable to
overcome repression and international isolation, which contributed to the failure of the
non-violent action.55
In the six cases that Schock tested in Unarmed Insurrections, the four successful
non-violent movements were able to enhance their leverage and resilience capabilities,
while the unsuccessful non-violent movements in Burma and China did not. In the four
successful cases, the non-violent movements implemented a range of actions across the
three methods of non-violent action, utilized a decentralized leadership structure,
employed methods of dispersion and concentration, and tactically innovated. The next
two sections will examine the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine
if a link was present between civil-society institutions and the challengers and the
consequential impact on the success of the non-violent action. By practicing these
techniques and strategies, the non-violent movements in South Africa, the Philippines,
Nepal, and Thailand were able to greatly enhance their leverage and resilience
capabilities, which contributed to the success of the non-violent action.
Another factor that Schock argues could impact the leverage and resilience of a
non-violent opposition network is the ability to implement “political jiu-jitsu:”56 to turn
repression efforts by the regime into increased support for the opposition movement.
Sharp states that “exposing the violence of the state in contrast to the nonviolence of
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protesters casts the state in a negative light and may lead to shifts in opinion that alter
power relations.”57 “Political jiu-jitsu” acts to increase the regime’s sensitivity to
pressure, which results in a shift in the power relationship between the challengers and
the regime. Keck and Sikkink parallel this concept, as they claim that support for an
opposition movement could increase its effectiveness if the repression by the regime is
exposed internationally, which could potentially attract transnational support that could
provide the movement with valuable resources and support.58 The resources and support
provided by international governments and non-governmental organizations to nonviolent movements strengthen the resistance capabilities of the movement and lessen the
ability of the authoritarian regime to continue repression efforts. Additionally, negative
international attention could result in political and economic sanctions that would weaken
the regime’s capacity to remain unaffected by pressure from the opposition.
2.7 Conclusion
The literature on the factors that enable success in non-violent action from a range
of fields may provide the thesis with a more comprehensive theoretical background, but
also signifies that theory on the factors that enable success in non-violent movement is
still limited its in ability to encompass all internal and external factors that impact the
ability of non-violent action to succeed. This chapter has discussed literature from
Schock and other scholars relevant to the three factors that this thesis will test. Another
limitation of the literature is that it lacks additional case studies testing Schock’s
conclusions. This thesis tests two new cases that supplement the six cases that Schock
tested in Unarmed Insurrections.
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Furthermore, Schock’s theory that a link between the challengers and civil-society
institutions, along with Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern, displays the importance
of domestic and international NGOs developing a connection with the challengers in
enabling success in non-violent action. Schock’s leadership decentralization theory
focuses more on the operational aspect of the non-violent action, as it explains the
significance of cooperation among the different civil-society institutions that are present
in an opposition network in enabling success. Schock’s third hypothesis, which asserts
that the leverage and resilience abilities of a non-violent movement can enable success,
builds on concepts taken from his other two theories. For example, Schock argues that a
link between civil-society institutions and the challengers and a decentralized leadership
structure are some of the factors that contribute to the movements’ ability to increase
their leverage and resilience capabilities. Schock’s three hypotheses, along with Sharp’s
non-violent action theory, create a theoretical framework that explains how and why
political structures, non-governmental organizations, a link between civil-society and the
challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and the leverage and resilience abilities
of a movement enhance the potential of non-violent action to succeed. The next three
chapters will test Schock’s three factors in the cases of Poland and Serbia to determine if
the three factors enabled the non-violent action to succeed.
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Chapter 3: Civil Society’s Role in Non-violent Revolutions
3.1 Chapter Overview
In order to assess the role of civil-society institutions in enabling success in nonviolent action, it is necessary to examine the impact of civil-society organizations in the
non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia. This chapter looks at how civil-society
institutions were involved in the opposition movements in Poland and Serbia and what
impact they had on the success of the movement. In both these movements, civil-society
institutions, such as religious organizations, independent trade unions, and student
groups, helped pressure the regimes to democratize by providing additional resources to
the movement and attracting international attention that galvanized support. The next
section of this chapter outlines Schock’s theory, as it pertains to non-violent revolutions
in general, and the role it played in the six cases that he analyzed in Unarmed
Insurrections.
Following the overview of Schock’s assessment of the contributions of civilsociety institutions to successful democratization movements, this chapter details the
participation of civil-society organizations in the pro-democracy movement in Poland
from 1980 through 1989. The next section explores the impact of civil-society
institutions on the non-violent uprising in Serbia starting in 1999, and concluding with
the resignation of Slobodan Milosevic in October, 2000. These sections examine the
leadership and organizers of the major campaigns and events of the movements and the
level of participation of civil-society organizations to discover how civil-society
institutions aided the movement. The leadership of the movement is important to
examine because it shows the level of involvement of domestic and transnational civil-
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society institutions in the major non-violent campaigns and events. By focusing on
leadership, this research will determine what individuals and/or organizations were
primarily responsible for the major non-violent campaigns and events and how such
events contributed to political outcomes. The chapter concludes with an overview of
civil-society involvement in the revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s
theory, which links civil-society institutions and challengers’ success, holds true for the
two cases.
3.2 The Link Between Civil-Society Institutions and Challengers in Non-violent Action
The link between civil-society institutions and the challengers, according to
Schock, is the development of an informal alliance between non-governmental
organizations and the challengers, which is responsible for the pooling of resources,
information sharing, coordinating non-violent action, and even providing additional
leadership to the movement.59 Schock contends that a link between civil society and the
opposition movement strengthens the ability of non-violent movements to succeed,
because of the heightened amounts of participation, resources, and media attention were
able to enhance support for the movement. The next two sections will investigate the
extent of the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers
in Poland and Serbia to determine whether Schock’s first dependent variable contributed
to their success.
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3.3 The Role of Solidarity and Other Civil-Society Institutions in Poland 1980 – 1989
In Poland, between 1980 and 1989, workers’ unions and other civil-society
organizations rose up against the regime. The non-violent movement in Poland in the
1980s saw the development of multiple civil-society institutions, especially Solidarity
(SOL) founded in late 1980.60 These organizations helped shift the balance of power
between the opposition and the regime in favor of pro-democracy movement through
aiding the ability of the movement to resist repression attempts and to help mobilize more
resources and people to organize larger protest events more often.61 Starting with an
introduction into pre-movement Polish civil-society, this section explores the
participation of civil-society institutions in the major campaigns and events throughout
the movement and, consequently, what impact the link between these organizations and
the challengers had on the success of the movement.
Pre-Solidarity Civil Society in Poland
Prior to 1980, civil-society institutions were typically government front
organizations or were weak to the point of inaction. Any civil-society institution, such as
religious groups and trade unions, were powerless, especially in any attempt to challenge
the regime. The Henryk Jab!o"ski regime, from 1972 to 1985, was able to effectively
limit the operational capacity of any opposition organizations, primarily through
repression and isolation, up until the beginning of 1980.62 In the mid-1970s, the first
wave of strikes by factory workers broke out across Poland protesting a rise in food
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prices, but was only moderately successful, in that the Soviet Union forced regime
resignations and reversed policy that only temporarily stabilized food prices and
unemployment rates. In the next year, any further strikes by factory workers were
quelled by government repression and by a lack of organization by the factory workers,
resulting in the return to the policies that had caused the first wave of strikes.63 Towards
the beginning of the 1980s, continued repression, decreasing wages, and further price
increases resulted in the formation of an opposition movement, which consisted of the
civil-society institution Solidarity, which also acted as an umbrella organization for
twenty-three civil-society institutions, pro-democracy activists, who were primarily nonlabor-industry individuals, such as students and the unemployed, and international civilsociety institutions, like the American Federation of Labor and Congress of International
Organizations (AFL-CIO). The next section examines the link between these civilsociety institutions and the challengers in Poland from 1980 through 1989.
The Introduction and Development of an Active Civil Society in Poland
What this study found throughout the research was that after the mostly
unsuccessful protests in the 1970s, the workers in Poland learned that uncoordinated
responses and violence were ineffective. In September 1980, after years of continued
repression, especially with regards to labor, the workers at a shipyard in Gdansk founded
Solidarity, whose official name is the Independent Self-governing Trade Union. The
founding of Solidarity, a local trade union, independent of government control, signified
the real beginning of an active civil society in Poland. Independent trade unions rapidly
spread and, by the end of 1980, Solidarity represented trade unions in 37 different regions
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across Poland. Participation in Solidarity aided in the development of the link between
domestic civil-society institutions and the challengers nationwide.64 By acting as an
umbrella institution for all independent trade unions, Solidarity was able to spread
information and innovate strategically, such as by shifting protest methods from strikes
alone to using over one hundred vehicles to blockade Warsaw in August, 1981,65 and to
boycotting the 1985 parliamentary elections.66
In researching the major campaigns and events of the Polish non-violent
movement between 1980 and 1989, this study discovered that although Solidarity
originated as a workers’ organization, it was able to work together with civil-society
institutions from different ideological and social backgrounds, such as academic
organizations, religious organizations, and political organizations.67 The collaboration
between these civil-society institutions was possible because the groups were able to
focus on a common goal of instituting a more democratic political system, instead of
targeting different objectives.68
Towards the end of 1980, civil-society organizations gradually became more
engaged in the collection and mobilization of event-planning information and counterintelligence, resources, and people. The initial success of Solidarity during the labor
64
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strikes of the early-1980’s helped to inspire increased development and engagement of
civil-society institutions into the non-violent movement.69 The first key instance of a link
between civil-society institutions and the protesters was on January 24, 1981, when the
largest of the Free Saturday strikes occurred, in which workers stayed home as opposed
to going to work. Although this was the third of the Free Saturday strikes, civil-society
institutions, such as the organizations consolidated under Solidarity, acted as a liaison
between the different factories, shipyards, and plants nationwide spreading information
regarding strategy, methods, and leadership decisions. The third Free Saturday strike was
far more coordinated than the previous two Free Saturday strikes and as a result, it was
estimated that over seven million workers participated, meaning that many industries
nationwide were incapable of functioning normally.70 After the success of the third Free
Saturday strike, the movement organized a wave of general strikes lasting from January
28 through February, led by Solidarity and a few other domestic civil-society institutions,
with participation peaking at 250,000 for a few of the events.
In August 1981, another wave of protests broke out in Warsaw, but in addition to
the typical use of strikes, these protests utilized vehicles, people, and other objects to
form a blockade around the city center. Approximately 100,000 people participated in
the blockade, which basically resulted in the city government halting operations.71 A
significant aspect of the blockades and protests was the role of domestic civil-society
institutions in organizing the people and events and implementing new strategies to
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prevent the police and military from stopping the non-violent action. These domestic
civil-society groups provided the movement with vehicles, people, and other resources
that made the blockade possible, since the individual challengers and activists were
unable to provide such resources. An instance of domestic civil-society organizations
providing resources where the challengers could not occurred at the city center blockade
protest, when groups like the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate (KCEP), the
domestic representative of the Roman Catholic Church, provided large vans to the
challengers, which were typically used for transporting the elderly around the community
and turned them into sizeable roadblocks.72
Martial Law and the Impact of Transnational Civil-Society Institutions
As a result of increased non-violent campaigns and protests, aided by the
participation of domestic civil-society organizations, the Jab!o"ski regime declared
martial law and banned the operation of most domestic civil-society institutions,
especially Solidarity. At this time, civil-society institutions were forced to operate
underground if they wanted to continue their non-violent action. In order to survive and
operate underground, domestic civil-society groups maintained their relationships with
one another through secret meetings, conversations, and coded messages, but the
underground movement was largely sustained by assistance from international nongovernmental organizations, which took over some of the responsibilities of the
challengers, such as resource collection and protest organizing that allowed the domestic
opposition network to remain out of the government’s spotlight. International non72
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governmental organizations organized protests in Poland by communicating information
and needs to the underground domestic groups and their supporters, pooling international
resources for the events, and spreading the word throughout the opposition network. For
example, international civil-society institutions, like Pomost and the Polish-American
Congress, held repeated demonstrations in Chicago and raised over a million dollars that
was sent to the opposition network in Poland through intermediaries.73
With the prohibition of domestic civil-society institutions in Poland, support from
a wide variety of international organizations and locations enabled the pro-democracy
movement to continue its progress. Although the Roman Catholic Church had already
been instrumental in the movement, numerous other international civil-society
institutions joined the movement. American religious organizations, such as Church
World Services (CWS) and Lutheran World Relief (LWR), sent blankets, quilts, clothing,
soap, and water cleansing pills to Solidarity.74 In addition to providing funds for office
and publishing supplies, the AFL-CIO also sent Solidarity cassette recorders, radios,
base-station antennas, and other electronic equipment.75
Although the protests and strikes gained international attention, the declaration of
martial law by the Jab!o"ski regime attracted even greater interest from international
organizations, other states, such as the United States and the Vatican, and transnational
civil-society institutions.76 International civil-society institutions, especially those related
directly to the Roman Catholic Church, like the National Catholic Union (ZNA), formed
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an underground network with Solidarity and other domestic groups that allowed the
movement to persist in the face of repression attempts by the government.77 Another
important addition to the opposition network in late-1981 was Rural Solidarity (SRI),
which incorporated a large portion of Polish farmers.
One of the most significant features of the underground opposition network was
that it was able to form parallel political, social, and economic institutions, such as an
underground newspaper and radio broadcast, which acted as the media representative for
the opposition movement, since the official media were government-run. This meant that
the opposition network had structured institutions that paralleled the government-run
institutions. Additionally, Solidarity had a coordinating office, which handled the
institutional operations of the organization, such as the collection and disbursement of
donations. Furthermore, since protesters and strikers were occasionally arrested, the
opposition network, through the assistance of international non-governmental
organizations, such as the Polish Legal Defense Fund, provided legal aid that was
typically denied by the state.78
These institutions allowed the movement to delegate event planning and
fundraising to different organizations and groups, which meant that the opposition
network could focus on the non-violent action instead of concerning itself with
administrative matters. Also, these parallel institutions made it possible for funds and
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supplies coming into Poland to reach the opposition network more easily, because the
resources no longer needed to pass through government entities that would typically
confiscate them.79
Between 1982 and 1985, domestic civil-society institutions grew marginally, but
the influx of transnational civil-society institutions to the opposition network allowed the
network to grow by providing additional resources, ideas, and leadership to the
movement.80 Even though the opposition remained underground, the movement was able
to continue to function normally and organized and led several pro-democracy protests,
with an estimated 60,000 protesters at some events.81 The introduction of liberal reforms
in the Warsaw Pact countries and the continued non-violent protests in Poland in 1984
through 1985 placed enough pressure on the Jab!o"ski regime that the Council of the
State of Poland chose Wojciech Jaruzelski to replace Jab!o"ski as chairman in 1985,
because the council believed that Jaruzelski would use greater military force to stabilize
Poland’s political situation.82
The Jaruzelski Regime and Political Transition
The appointment of Jaruzelski had numerous implications for the role of domestic
and international civil-society institutions as part of the non-violent opposition
movement. A major point of divergence between Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski was that
Jab!o"ski came from an academic background, whereas Jaruzelski was a career military
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officer and was thus much more militant toward protests and resistance. The opposition
movement, if it wanted to continue to pressure the regime, had to forge a stronger
network of civil-society organizations and challengers. The ability of the movement to
persist in the face of more extensive repression efforts by the regime is displayed through
increased participation by civil-society organizations after 1985. Strikes, protests,
student sit-ins, and media campaigns could continue normally, as a result of the growth
and inclusion of domestic and transnational civil-society institutions in the movement.83
By 1988, the movement was at its most powerful, enacting protests, campaigns,
and other events daily, with participation well in the thousands per event. From 1985 to
1988, the majority of domestic civil-society groups operated underground, but
transnational civil-society organizations took a prominent role in the movement, even
bringing in support from the Roman Catholic Church at its highest level, as the Pope
spoke in favor of the opposition movement. The Pope’s visit to Poland in 1987 and the
support he gave the Solidarity movement raised morale and inspired a large number of
Polish citizens to participate in the movement.84 Outside of the domestic civil-society
organizations, like Solidarity, Rural Solidarity, and the Workers’ Defense Committee
(KOR), transnational civil-society institutions, like Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Project
Hope, supplied the movement with moral support, along with financial support, gathered
primarily through international donations, and medical supplies to the challengers. Since
Solidarity’s ideological perspectives, such as dedication to the common good and the
interconnectivity of all people, were derived from Catholic Social Thought, this meant
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that religious civil-society organizations, such as those related to the Roman Catholic
Church, were more likely to support the movement.85
An additional benefit of the involvement of transnational civil-society institutions
was that since they were previously connected to the Polish people, the challengers were
typically more accepting of the leadership, ideas, and strategy of these groups. In other
words, prior familiarity with these organizations made it easier for people to trust and
identify with these groups, making it easier for these groups to mobilize people and
resources when they became involved in the opposition network.86 Notably, the Roman
Catholic Church had a deep connection with a large number of Polish citizens prior to the
opposition movement, which meant that when the opposition movement began, the
challengers already had familiarity with the Catholic civil-society institutions making it
easier for the challengers to know how to communicate and work with the organizations.
Even after the legalization of Solidarity and other groups during the roundtable talks with
the Jaruzelski regime in 1989, civil-society institutions continued to collaborate closely
with non-affiliated pro-democracy individuals and activists, through the same channels
used during the underground years, until the political transition was complete.
The pro-democracy movement in Poland in the 1980s was not isolated from
external and internal political and economic factors, but these factors only supplemented
the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the Polish challengers.
As Poland experienced after the increase in meat prices, economic crises caused people
who were previously inactive in the movement to become rapidly radicalized and joined
civil-society institutions, like Solidarity and Group Against Job Discrimination (GAB), or
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formed their own organizations. Additionally, the replacement of Jab!o"ski with a more
militant leader in Jaruzelski implied that the regime would order more aggressive
repression efforts. This brought more people into the movement, since people became
increasingly outraged with the force that the government used to respond to the nonviolent action.87 The economic recession and the regime transition in Poland provided
“political opportunities” that the non-violent movement used to strengthen the opposition
network, while weakening the Polish government’s repression abilities. The
relationships among political elites were fractured on multiple levels, as leaders in the
Polish United Workers’ Party and the Soviet Union were split on the recent regime
transition and how to handle the recession.88 The instability of alliances among the
political elites weakened the political system’s underlying power relations that created a
“political opportunity structure” that the non-violent movement capitalized on.89
In the 1980’s, international and domestic civil-society institutions developed a
link with the challengers in the pro-democracy movement in Poland that contributed to
the success of the non-violent action. Independent labor unions, like Solidarity, and
international non-governmental organizations, like Pomost and the KCEP, and
government-funded organizations, like the National Endowment for Democracy,
provided funds and leadership to the opposition network, which succeeded in
implementing democratic institutions and features, such as pluralism, which is the
development and active participation of competing political parties and interest groups in
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the political system. Although domestic civil-society institutions, especially Solidarity,
were the foundation of the movement from 1980 until 1989, international civil-society
institutions supplemented the opposition network financially and physically, especially
during the prohibition of domestic civil-society institutions from 1982 to 1988. The
domestic and international civil-society institutions connected with the challengers to
strengthen the non-violent movement in Poland that contributed to the success of the nonviolent action by providing additional resources, participants, and international attention,
which helped strengthen the movement’s operational and persistence abilities.90
3.4 Civil-Society Institutions in the Serbian Transition to Democracy 1999 – 2000
The non-violent action in Serbia from 1999 to 2000 that resulted in the overthrow
of the Slobodan Milosevic regime was characterized by the overwhelming influence of
domestic and civil-society organizations. In a manner similar to Poland in the 1980s,
civil-society groups played a direct role in the ability of the non-violent movement to
mobilize and to resist severe repression attempts from the Milosevic regime. In addition
to leadership from the youth organization Otpor! (Resistance! in English), the opposition
network consisted of several international non-governmental organizations, primarily
from the human rights sector, and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, a coalition of
opposition political parties.91 Through an analysis of the major campaigns and events of
the non-violent movement, this section details the role of both domestic and international
civil-society institutions in the non-violent movement and consequentially what impact
they might have had on the success of the action.
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Civil-Society Institutions in Serbia prior to 1999
Before 1999, there was a wave of non-violent protests in Serbia in response to
widely disputed election results that kept the Milosevic regime in power. In November
1996, students in Ni# began a series of protests against a new government policy that
made the state responsible for the appointment of all university professors and were
quickly joined by other students from all of Serbia, especially in the capital, Belgrade.92
These protests were easily repressed by the Milosevic regime, due primarily to the
inability of the students to form a network among themselves, and with Zajedno
(Together, in English), which was a network formed by the political opponents of the
regime. The inability of the protesters to form a network was primarily the product of a
lack of protest experience and knowledge of protest strategies and techniques among the
students and the Zajedno coalition.93 This lack of cooperation among the opposition,
combined with a lack of international support from non-governmental organizations
severely limited the operational capacity of the pro-democracy protesters. The majority
of international non-governmental organizations, such as the Open Society Institute and
Freedom House, did not become involved in the pro-democracy protests at this point,
since the Milosevic regime managed to isolate Serbia from international attention. As a
consequence of civil-society institutions not participating in the movement, the student
movement and Zajedno had difficulties collecting and mobilizing resources and people,
sharing information, and developing strategy. These problems allowed the Milosevic
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regime to easily divide the movement, imprison the leadership, and use military and
police forces to effectively shut down any attempted protests.94
Domestic Civil-Society Institutions and the Non-violent Movement, 1999-2000
After the failed non-violent protests from 1996 through 1997, opposition in Serbia
was quieted, but in 1998, Otpor! was founded in opposition to a series of restrictive laws
at the University of Belgrade that limited freedom of press and speech. Although this
student organization was founded because of problems at the university, the movement
quickly refocused its efforts towards the Milosevic regime as the origin of the majority of
problems in Serbia. As with the previous attempt at non-violent action, Otpor! lacked
organization and leadership, which threatened the success of the movement from the
beginning, as early pro-democracy protests were troubled by weak mobilization and
resilience abilities. Starting in June 1999, the anti-Milosevic regime protests, led by
Otpor!, had poor participation and was once again easily limited by repression.
Following a reorganization process that included a more democratic leadership structure,
development of its own media institutions—including a paper and a variety of other
printed material—and a revised strategy, developed directly from the Politics of
Nonviolent Action by Gene Sharp, Otpor! became increasingly active in the prodemocracy movement.95 By instituting a more democratic leadership structure, the prodemocracy movement enhanced its ability to avoid government repression, a process
examined in greater detail in the next two chapters.
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An important aspect of the composition of the Serbian opposition network was
that although there were only a few domestic civil-society organizations involved in the
network, they were deeply connected to the challengers throughout the entire movement.
Even non-politically oriented groups, such as the fan club of the Red Star Belgrade
soccer team, provided the protesters in Belgrade with electronic devices to monitor police
radio transmissions.96 Additionally, the Open Society Institute’s Belgrade office taught
students and other ambitious activists about non-violent methods, global democracy
movements, and past human-rights campaigns.97 The link between civil-society
institutions and the pro-democracy challengers is relatively apparent, since the majority
of resources, people, information, strategy, and action originated from Otpor!. This
indicates that not only was Otpor! a key member in the opposition network, but also that
prior to the arrival of international civil-society institutions that it was the principal force
behind the movement. From late-1999 on, domestic civil-society institutions, especially
youth organizations, would continue to connect with the regime challengers, but would
gain assistance from several international organizations.98
The Role of Transnational Non-Governmental Organizations in the Opposition Network
In the first few months of 2000 an international dimension was added to the
opposition network, as a multitude of transnational civil-society institutions entered the
movement, including human rights organizations and election monitoring groups, like the
Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID). Excluding the rock concert rally in
November 1999, international civil-society organizations were essentially not involved in
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the movement until April 2000, when they took a direct role in the mobilization of people
and resources for the pro-democracy protests. From April 2000 through September 2000,
transnational civil-society institutions, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty
International, formed a network with Otpor! and an alliance of opposition political
parties, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) that was responsible for the
coordination of most protests, events, and media campaigns.99 The contributions of the
international non-governmental organizations were crucial to the success of the nonviolent action, since they were able to attract international attention that would focus
global pressure on the Milosevic regime, without experiencing the same level of
repression as the domestic groups. The global pressure that was focused on the
Milosevic regime in Serbia included political and economic sanctions, official
denunciations, and increasingly negative international press.
One of the largest benefits of the inclusion of transnational civil-society
organizations was that they provided the opposition network with greater communication
and press capabilities. Although the domestic opposition network was able to develop
parallel media institutions, such as a newspaper, the Drevni Telegraf, their ability to reach
wider audiences outside of Serbia was extremely limited. After joining the non-violent
movement in Serbia, transnational civil-society institutions were rapidly able to attract
greater international attention to the situation, which in return helped minimize the
attempts of the Milosevic regime to isolate the country, especially from the United States
and Western Europe. Organizations like the Institute for War and Peace Reporting,
Freedom House, and Human Rights Watch amplified the voices of the movement with a
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continuous supply of reports on the non-violent action to the international community. It
was important to the Milosevic regime to attempt to isolate Serbia because it would
allow the regime to continue repression without criticism from the international
community, especially from political and economic allies like Russia, due to the
government’s violations of civil and human rights.100
In the Serbian non-violent movement against the Milosevic regime, transnational
civil-society institutions developed operational links with both the domestic civil-society
organizations and the challengers. On September 27, 2000, the direct connection
between these international groups and the challengers was seen as these transnational
civil-society institutions, especially CESID, provided transportation and other resources
necessary to create a strong protest against the election outcome in Belgrade.101 Over one
hundred thousand people participated in the pro-democracy protests, including
approximately 30,000 election monitors from both domestic and international civilsociety institutions, such as CESID, Exit 2000, DOS, and Otpor!. In addition to
supporting a “Get Out the Vote” campaign across Serbia prior to the election, human
rights groups and election monitoring NGOs also participated heavily in the post-election
protests after Milosevic claimed a successful re-election.102
In the beginning of October, citizens across Serbia took part in protests and
workers went on mass strikes nationwide, most notably the workers at the Kolubara
mines, which were previously strong supporters of the Milosevic regime. Since non-
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government unionization was rare in Serbia, these workers coordinated protests,
campaigns, and economic boycotts with DOS and Otpor! in order to ensure that the
strikes would effectively pressure the regime. Since both Poland and Serbia were heavily
industrialized countries, the economies of both countries depended on factories and mines
operating normally. In both Poland and Serbia, the industrial nature of the countries
signifies that strikes could more effectively impact the economy, pressuring the
government to resolve the conflict.
Unlike the laborers in Poland, the mineworkers in Serbia were not responsible
for the commencement of the movement, but joined towards the very end of the
movement to provide a final blow to the regime. In the beginning of October 2000,
industries across Serbia were all on strike, students continued protests in most cities, and
transnational NGOs continued to help focus international attention on the situation.103 By
October 5, 2000, the opposition network was basically able to freeze normal activity in
Serbia, including a full-scale blockade in Belgrade, which gained notoriety for having a
bulldozer at the protests that quickly became a symbol for the movement.104 In addition
to the opposition network’s connection with the challengers, a large portion of the
domestic police and military forces joined the movement in the first week of October
2000. This signified that the movement had become so powerful that it was even able to
convince the regime’s forces, which had previously followed orders, to join the
movement.105 The connection between the challengers and domestic and international
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civil-society institutions meant that the opposition network was more able to successfully
mobilize, resist repression, and garner international support.
3.5 Conclusion
This chapter compared the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia and
whether these movements follow Schock’s explanation of the link between civil-society
organizations and the challengers and movement success. This research is not able to
definitively conclude that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers
determines whether non-violent action will succeed, but civil-society institutions, ranging
from religious groups to student organizations, were heavily involved in the opposition
network, and this involvement increased the potential for success in these two
movements. This is because the civil-society groups provided the opposition network
with funding, additional leadership, material resources, technology, publishing materials,
and international attention that enhanced the ability of the movement to organize events,
mobilize protesters, and avoid repression.
While the link between civil-society institutions and the challengers supplied the
pro-democracy movement in Serbia with enhanced resilience there were other factors,
such as the declining economy and the war involving Serbia, as they providing a political
opening that the non-violent movement utilized to its benefit. The economic crisis and
war divided political leaders within the Serbian government, which impaired the
government’s ability to quickly respond to the non-violent action. Like the Solidarity
movement in Poland, the non-violent movement in Serbia benefited from a downturn in
the economy and political crises that provided additional challengers to the opposition
network. The economic downturn in Serbia in early-2000 frustrated thousands of
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individuals, especially those who became unemployed and then entered the movement by
joining civil-society institutions to voice their dissatisfaction.
Another factor that played an important role in the mobilization of thousands into
the movement was the ongoing war that Serbia fighting over the Kosovo region that led
to human rights violations and the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces in 2000, which the
Milosevic regime was largely blamed for as the war was unpopular among the Serbian
population.106 As a result, people grew increasingly frustrated with the government
actions and felt that a democratic political system might prevent the continuation of these
events. Although the NATO bombing of Serbia and the economic recession were highly
influential in the development of a more active citizenry, the main impact was that these
factors simply aided the development of a link between civil-society institutions and the
challengers, as they helped increase the involvement of people in the non-violent
movement.107
In Poland, the non-violent movement was able to efficiently mobilize thousands
of protesters and strikers, rapidly share strategy and information among the opposition
network, and resist repeated repression attempts. A significant factor in its ability to
accomplish these actions was that both domestic and international civil-society
institutions were able to develop a stable link with the challengers in Poland. This link
not only helped in the recruitment of additional protesters and organizations, but it also
increased the operational and resistance capabilities of the movement in a variety of
ways, such as improved fundraising and decentralizing the movement’s leadership. Since
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the network consisted of more than just individuals, other groups and individuals were
able to feel more comfortable with entering the movement, because increased
international participation implied that it was more difficult for repression and isolation
efforts to succeed. Additionally, by introducing civil-society institutions with existing
organizational leadership structures and democratic features to the movement, the
opposition network began to become more democratic and was able to develop more
experienced leadership teams throughout the movement.108
Another important aspect of the role of civil-society institutions in the movement
was that during this period, Poland experienced exponential growth in the development
of domestic civil-society institutions, inspired by the success of Solidarity. In other
words, the civil-society institutions were able to help enhance the capabilities of the
movement, but were also crucial to the development of other civil-society institutions that
would eventually join the movement.109 Although domestic civil-society institutions,
such as Solidarity, were instrumental to the success of the movement, international NGOs
were also vital to the survival of the opposition network, especially during the
underground years. International NGOs provided the movement with international
support, greater financial and material resources, and an influx of new strategy, such as
the vans and protesters that civil-society institutions related to the Roman Catholic
Church provided for the blockade of Warsaw in 1981.
In Serbia, domestic and transnational civil-society institutions were able to build a
direct link with the anti-Milosevic regime challengers, which resulted in the increased
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operational and resistance capacity of the opposition network. One of the major
differences between the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia was the composition of
the opposition network in terms of institutions and individuals. There was minimal
development of new domestic civil-society institutions in Serbia before and during the
movement. This meant that the majority of individuals wishing to participate in the
movement did not join another group, which then merged with the opposition network,
but directly joined the movement. The pro-democracy movement in Serbia provided an
umbrella organization in the opposition network for anyone who desired to participate in
the non-violent action. The link between non-governmental organizations and the
challengers aided in the recruitment and mobilization of thousands of Serbian protesters,
including individuals from a diverse background, with a sizeable portion from outside the
youth organizations.
Finally, the involvement of transnational NGOs in the movement meant that, like
Poland, the opposition movement in Serbia was able to attract greater international
interest and increase its power. International human-rights organizations and domestic
and international election-monitoring groups provided additional support to the
opposition network that helped the movement gain greater international attention by
releasing reports regarding human rights violations and the fraudulent elections.
The non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia both display a link between
civil-society institutions and the challengers, which impacted their potential for success.
In both movements, assistance from domestic and international civil-society institutions
provided the opposition network with increased mobilization, operation, and resistance
capabilities. The organizations did this by providing additional leadership, financial
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support, campaign resources, new strategies, international attention, and greater
participation. By supplying the movements in Poland and Serbia with these resources,
the leverage and resilience abilities of the movement were greatly increased, which is
discussed further in Chapter 5. The movements, with help from civil-society institutions,
were more easily able to resist repression and assemble support nationwide in a matter of
hours by email communications.110
Other structural factors, such as economic crises, war, and human rights
violations, were essential to the success of the movement, but only in the sense that they
provided supplementary support to the opposition network by increasing the number of
challengers and participation in civil-society institutions. The rise in support for the prodemocracy movement is explained by the political-opportunity-structure theory,111 which
would emphasize that the opposition network capitalized on the outrage of Serbian
citizens over the war, human-rights violations, and the economic crisis to gain support for
the pro-democracy movement. The war, human-rights violations, and the economic crisis
made the Serbian citizens more inclined to institute a more democratic system, which
created a political opportunity that the pro-democracy movement used to its advantage.
With regard to Schock’s explanation that a link between civil-society institutions and the
challengers impacts the success of non-violent action, it is possible to conclude that a link
between civil-society institutions and the challengers enhanced the ability of the
movements in Poland and Serbia to resist repression, share resources, and mobilize
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thousands of pro-democracy protesters. The pro-democracy movements in Poland and
Serbia capitalized on political opportunities created by regime transition, economic
crises, and war, which aided the development of the link between civil-society
institutions and the challengers.
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Chapter 4: Leadership Structure of Opposition Networks is Non-violent Movements
4.1 Chapter Overview
The second factor that this study analyzes is the leadership structure of the
opposition network in non-violent movements and if a more decentralized structure can
increase the potential for the success of non-violent action. This chapter examines the
structural composition of the leadership in the non-violent movements in Poland and
Serbia to determine whether either had a decentralized structure that consisted of multiple
leaders or leadership teams, working through democratic processes. Additionally, this
chapter explores the consequential effects of a decentralized leadership structure on the
ability of the non-violent action to succeed in these two cases. The next section of this
chapter summarizes Schock’s theory, as it relates to non-violent revolutions in general,
and the impact it had in the six cases that he analyzed in Unarmed Insurrections.
Following an outline of Schock’s second factor, this chapter analyzes the
leadership structure of the Solidarity movement in Poland between 1980 and 1989 to
determine whether the leadership in the movement was divided among different groups
and individuals. Then, the next section illustrates the organization of the leadership of
the pro-democracy movement in Serbia. Both of these parts explore the leadership in the
major campaigns and events of the movements and any descriptions of the configuration
of the movements’ leadership detailed in primary and secondary sources. The chapter
concludes with an overview of the decentralization of leadership structures in the
revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s theory, which asserts that
decentralized leadership in non-violent action is necessary, but not sufficient in enabling
success, is accurate for these two cases.
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4.2 Decentralization of the Leadership in Opposition Networks
According to Schock, a decentralized leadership structure signifies that a network
shares leadership responsibilities among the different individuals and organizations of
that network.112 Schock contends that a decentralized network aids the ability of the nonviolent movement to succeed for five reasons: the inability of the government to focus
repression efforts on a specific target; it allows for progress when leaders are imprisoned
or eliminated; the movement becomes increasingly democratic in nature, which promotes
cooperation and ensures that all members of the movement have a say in the direction of
the movement; it allows the movement to focus on a common goal, which allows for
diverse groups to work together while minimizing conflict; and it enhances the ability of
the movement to innovate strategically, since the organization of the movement enhances
“flexibility and the capacity for horizontal information flow” and to implement a greater
variety of methods more easily than “more bureaucratically structured and ideologically
rigid” movements.113 The next two sections investigate the extent of the decentralization
of the leadership structure of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia to
determine whether Schock’s second dependent variable was necessary, but not sufficient
for their success.
4.3 Organizational Leadership in the Non-Violent Movement in Poland, 1980 – 1989
The Solidarity movement in Poland, starting in Gdansk in 1980, eventually
achieved a peaceful political transition in 1989, because the independent trade union,
Solidarity, acted as an umbrella organization that coordinated the protest efforts of all
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pro-democracy strikers. This section explores the leadership structure of the non-violent
movement in Poland in the 1980s, through two main methods. First, this study explains
leadership throughout the movement, as seen through the major non-violent campaigns
and events. Second, this section evaluates the level of decentralization in the leadership
structure of the opposition network in Poland, by studying primary and secondary sources
to discover a more in-depth description provided by a variety of authors.
Leadership in Major Non-violent Campaigns and Events
The non-violent action in Poland that took place throughout the 1980s was
primarily led by Solidarity, but that is only the case because Solidarity acted as an
umbrella organization for a variety of institutions from the civic, labor, liberal,
nationalist, religious, nationalist, agricultural, and youth sectors.114 Under Solidarity’s
umbrella, the spectrum of organizations included religious institutions like the KIK,
KCEP, and ZNK, student groups, like the Independent Association of Students and
Young Poland Movement, leftist groups like RPS, and civic groups like the Civic
Committee to Build a Monument In Honor of Victims of Katyn (KPZ).115 Even prior to
the founding of Solidarity in 1980, the burgeoning movement still had a decentralized
leadership structure, but was less organized and unable to coordinate diverse protests.
Until the meat price strikes in the summer of 1980, the movement had yet to develop a
leadership structure of any kind, but on August 16, 1980, the Inter-factory Strike
Committee formed, which would act as the first real organizer and leader of the pro-
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democracy protests.116 Although Lech Walesa, a former employee in the Lenin (Gdansk)
Shipyard who was fired, initially took leadership of the protests, it was not only Walesa,
as other activists from that factory joined him as leaders of the strikes, including Lech
Kaczy"ski and Anna Walentynowicz. From 1981 through 1982, all of the major nonviolent campaigns and events were led by Solidarity, which does not display any level of
decentralization in the leadership structure.117 This does not signify that the leadership
structure of the of opposition network was decentralized, but does require this study to
investigate first and second-hand accounts of the Solidarity movement, which more
accurately describes the structure of the network.
Starting in 1982, the prohibition of independent trade unions and other civilsociety institutions, through the imposition of martial law, forced the movement
underground, which is where the protests would continue to originate from until 1988.
Throughout this time, Solidarity still acted as the leadership for the movement, but with
assistance from other groups, especially related to the Roman Catholic Church.118
Although it is difficult to ascertain the level of decentralization in the structure of the
opposition network throughout this time through these events, this study also needs to
examine other perspectives to show a clearer explanation of the organization of the
movement. After the reemergence of Solidarity and other banned groups in the late1980s, the movement primarily stayed under the direction of a single organization, but
that is only as a result of the consolidation of all the other organizations under a single
institution, which is shown through an examination of additional sources in the next part.
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Decentralization of the Leadership in the Solidarity Movement in Poland
Since it was difficult to determine whether the leadership structure of the nonviolent movement was decentralized, it is necessary to analyze what authors have
described about the organization of the opposition network. Sociologist Maryjane Osa
provides insight into the organizational ties in the Solidarity movement between 1980 and
1981 by constructing a network connection figure that shows how the movement quickly
decentralized its leadership among a total of twenty-three different institutions.119 Osa’s
interconnectivity graph (Appendix 6) shows the interconnectedness of organizations
across the network, which includes a variety of organizations, especially Solidarity, the
Worker’s Defense Committee (KOR), and the Sign organization (ZNK).120 The
interconnectedness among the diverse organizations implies that although they may have
consolidated into the Solidarity movement, they were still autonomous institutions that
each played an important role in the non-violent action. In other words, the opposition
movement was led by Solidarity, but Solidarity was not only an individual entity, but also
a collective of assorted organizations and groups. By acting as an umbrella organization,
Solidarity was primarily responsible for the organization and coordination of protest
efforts, but a variety of groups under the Solidarity movement were responsible for
numerous duties, including leading local, regional, and national protests. One example of
the duties undertaken by organizations under Solidarity’s umbrella is that organizations,
like the Movement for Defense of Human and Civic Rights (ROP) and the Sign (ZNK),
published periodicals that provided a wide array of information for protesters and
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international spectators, such as meeting times, protest information, and descriptions and
results of the latest events.121
Throughout the following decade, scores of civil-society institutions began to
develop and join the Solidarity movement, each taking a unique role in the leadership of
the movement, further decentralizing the leadership structure in the opposition network.
As a result of the continual addition of new and diverse organizations, it was essential for
the Solidarity movement to ensure that each group was able to take an active role in the
leadership of the non-violent action. One manner that the pro-democracy movement
attempted to democratize aspects of the movement was the creation of groups of leaders
from different organizations that would work together to come up with solutions.
Although Lech Walesa and the Solidarity institution were the leading voice behind the
opposition network, Walesa was supported by several other organizations from numerous
areas, especially from the Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) and the Movement of
Free Democrats (RWD).122 An important representation of the level of decentralization
in the leadership structure in the opposition network was that in 1981 Walesa was
arrested after the declaration of martial law, but the movement continued to strike.
Although some scholars, such as sociologist Boris Kagarlitsk, claimed that the
Solidarity movement was successful primarily due to its charismatic leader, Walesa, the
movement persisted throughout his imprisonment.123 Since even communication with
Walesa was limited during his time in prison, the movement still organized a number of
protests and strikes nationwide.124 This implies that Walesa was an important leader for
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the movement, but the leadership structure in the opposition network was decentralized
enough to allow for continuation of the non-violent action during his arrest. While
underground, the movement became even more decentralized, because of the prohibition
of Solidarity, which saw the opposition network work through a much looser structure.
The movement did this in order to allow for groups that were banned, like Solidarity, to
operate, but avoid further repression by the government.125
The development and consolidation of new organizations into the Solidarity
umbrella continued throughout all of the 1980s, resulting in an extraordinarily large
opposition network consisting of over a hundred different groups. Sociologists Grzegorz
Ekiert and Jan Kubik provide insight into the level of decentralization of the Solidarity
movement towards the end of decade by listing the number of different organizations that
were responsible for sponsoring or leading protests in 1989. Ekiert and Kubik find that
out of the 314 total non-violent protest events that took place that year over half of the
events were led or sponsored by a total of at least 156 different organizations.126
Although the data was unavailable for over half the events in 1989, the other half were
led by a mixture of political parties, labor unions, peasant/farmer organizations, interest
groups, social/political movements, and other miscellaneous organizations. The total
number and range of these organizations implies that although they acted under the
Solidarity movement, that the structure of the network was highly decentralized, but
coordinated.127
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4.4 Leadership Structure in the Serbian Transition to Democracy, 1999 – 2000
The pro-democracy movement in Serbia towards the end of the twentieth century
also had a decentralized leadership structure that increased the ability of the movement to
resist repression and consequently enhanced their potential to achieve a peaceful political
transition. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the protests in Serbia in 1996 and 1997 were
unsuccessful, as they were easily dispersed by the Milosevic regime. One of the main
factors that contributed to the failure of these protests was that student groups, political
opposition institutions, and other pro-democracy organizations remained separate
throughout their protests, even when rallying against the same issues in the same
location.128 The complete lack of cooperation among these groups made it easy for the
Milosevic regime to target the leaders and organizers of each event and either arrest them
or shut down the protest. This section investigates the degree of collaboration among
organizations in the pro-democracy non-violent movement between 1999 and 2000 to
determine the level of decentralization in the leadership structure of the opposition
network.
Diverse Leadership in the Pro-democracy Non-Violent Movement
Between June 1999 and October 2000, the opposition movement in Serbia
assembled numerous events of non-violent action that were designed to place the
maximum amount of pressure on the Slobodan Milosevic regime. The major non-violent
campaigns and events in this movement display a variety of different leaders, from
different areas of society in Serbia, especially the student, political, and labor sectors.
After the failures of the earlier protests in 1996 through 1997, the opposition network in
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Serbia, initiated by the actions of the student group, Otpor!, quickly coordinated and
organized protest efforts across the country. In 1998, Otpor! began to organize and
coordinate other student groups at the University of Belgrade, as a result of increasingly
restrictive university policies.129
In June 1999, Otpor! initiated and led the first major non-violent event against the
Serbian government, but was not limited to participation by students only, as
disillusioned voters and other pro-democracy protesters joined in the protest. Two
months later, in August 1999, Otpor! held a mock “birthday party” for Milosevic, which
ridiculed the politics, personality, and possible fate of the Serbian dictator. Additionally,
other large non-violent events were held between September and November, highlighted
by nationwide rock concert rallies that were coordinated and directed by the ANEM
media network.130 These events indicate that the burgeoning opposition network was
minimally coordinated, but that the movement as a whole was moving closer to
developing a united front against the regime, as the bombing of Serbia by NATO forces
became larger and more frequent, which furthered anti-Milosevic sentiment among the
Serbian population. The swell of support from Serbian citizens and organizations like the
ANEM network and local radio stations, such as Rock Volieb, signified that the
movement was starting to gain groups and individuals from diverse organizations and
segments of society and that these new groups were beginning to play a role in the
movement.131
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In early-2000, the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) was developed, which
initially consisted of the eighteen major opposition political parties. The Democratic
Opposition of Serbia would play a crucial leadership role, alongside Otpor! in a majority
of the key events leading to the resignation of Milosevic. Otpor! and DOS each played a
specific role in the movement, as DOS handled the political aspects of the movement,
such as providing opposition candidates and holding more formal political rallies, while
Otpor! organized unique and creative non-violent campaigns and protests, such as
holding rock concert rallies and using t-shirts and bumper stickers to spread slogans and
messages. From April 2000 to late-September 2000, Otpor! and the DOS worked
together at the forefront of every major campaign and event, excluding the “Face of
Serbia” campaign, which was predominately organized and executed by only Otpor!.132
An important aspect of the DOS joining the leadership ranks of the movement
was that they were able to help increase participation numbers for each event, as the
political parties were already developed institutionally and also had additional resources
that helped strengthen the movement. During this time period, participation numbers for
the major non-violent campaigns and events averaged between 20,000 and 100,000
protesters, which not only shows the benefits of adding new leadership to the movement,
but also helps show how protests became harder to break up, since the protesters greatly
outnumbered government forces at most events.133 In addition to the leadership provided
by Otpor! and DOS, workers began to mobilize and strike nationwide, as laborers in
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multiple industries joined the movement, most notably the miners at the Kolubara
mines.134
What these events display is that at the beginning of the movement, there was not
much of a well-coordinated opposition network, instead there were loosely affiliated
organizations protesting the same government and issues. Throughout the earlier events,
Otpor! acted as a semi-umbrella organization, that consolidated the efforts of individuals,
even non-students, into a single more efficient movement. The introduction of the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia into the non-violent movement as a large coalition of
organizations and individuals meant that Otpor! was no longer responsible for the sole
management of the movement. The pro-democracy network became further
decentralized with the inclusion of DOS, since they provided equal leadership in the
network to Otpor!. At this point, the opposition network in Serbia consisted of two large
umbrella institutions that coordinated efforts to help increase the general abilities of the
movement. The major non-violent campaigns and events also show that towards the end
of the movement, greater decentralization in the opposition network occurred with the
addition of labor unions, which took a strong leadership role, working closely with both
Otpor! and the DOS. Between the beginning and the end of the non-violent movement,
the opposition network increased in size, with the additions of the DOS and the labor
unions, which also meant that the leadership structure of this group became increasingly
decentralized.
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Supplemental Descriptions of the Leadership Structure in Serbia
Although the major non-violent campaigns and events provide good insight into
the structure and interaction of leadership in the opposition network in Serbia, it is also
necessary to look at supplementary sources to provide additional perspectives into the
leadership structure. First, foreign media correspondent Matthew Collin investigates the
pro-democracy movement in Serbia, starting in the late-1999s, and provides an detailed
analysis of the coordination between groups in the opposition network, especially Otpor!
and the Democratic Opposition of Serbia. Next, this section reviews political scientists
Ramet and Pavlakovic’s Serbia Since 1989, which describe the methods of leadership in
the non-violent movement.
In The Time of Rebels, Collin details the non-violent movement in Serbia that
eventually produced a successful political transition, but he also provides first and
second-hand accounts of the interaction and coordination of the leadership in the
movement. Prior to the inclusion of the DOS to the opposition network in early-2000,
Collin states that Otpor! was the sole leader of the movement, but within the institution,
there were several different branches and leaders. Even early in the movement, Otpor!
democratized most aspects of the organization, such as creating a leadership branch,
which handled the organization and operation of the events and the development of a
media campaign branch that was responsible for the printing and spreading of prodemocracy print materials.135 Once the Democratic Opposition of Serbia joined the
opposition network, Collin describes that the majority of leadership responsibilities was
shared between both organizations. The two institutions collaborated on the organization
of events, the mobilization of resources and people, and decisions affecting the direction
135
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of the movement. Since the DOS leadership was highly decentralized, as a result of the
nature of political parties in general, the ability of the two groups to join forces produced
devolution of leadership in the movement. In other words, both Otpor! and the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia were largely decentralized organization prior to their
alliance, which implies that the leadership in the Serbian opposition network was not only
spread across the network, but also throughout each organization.136
Chapter 3 discussed the role of transnational civil-society institutions in the
movement. Although international groups helped lead some of the protests and events,
and were especially responsible for the general strength of the movement, the leadership
of the movement remained predominately between Otpor! and the DOS. In Serbia Since
1989, Ramet and Pavlakovic describe the interplay of international organizations with the
leadership of the opposition network. They explain that the international organizations,
such as Amnesty International and United States Institute of Peace, provided support to
the movement, but primarily by attracting international attention to the movement, while
the domestic opposition network organized the actual non-violent action.137 The
connection between the leadership structures of international institutions and the
domestic opposition network also indicates that neither domestic nor international
organizations were dominant in the movement, signaling a highly decentralized structure
in the leadership of the movement, as all groups were able to take an active leadership
role in one way or another.
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4.5 Conclusion
In the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia, strong opposition networks
with highly decentralized leadership structures were responsible for the organization and
coordination of nationwide non-violent action events and campaigns. The movements in
Poland and Serbia share numerous similarities regarding the level of decentralization in
the leadership structure of the opposition network, such as the use of umbrella
organizations and involvement of international non-governmental organizations.
Although both networks had some similarities, they also had several differences, such as
the composition and role of the umbrella organizations, which were not influential
enough to impact the success of either movement.
The Solidarity movement in Poland during the 1980s was responsible for the
coordination and organization of a sizeable portion the major non-violent campaigns and
events that contributed to successful political transition. Although it appeared that
Solidarity was the principal leader in the movement, because of their leadership in the
major campaigns and events, the reality was that the opposition network consisted of
leadership from various institutions and individuals, such as Solidarity, Rural Solidarity,
and Union of Young Democrats.138 In Poland, the beginning of the Solidarity movement
had a moderately high level of decentralization in the leadership structure compared to
the other non-violent movements that Schock studied, which was evident in the
interconnectivity of the twenty-three organizations in the opposition network in 1981.139
From 1981 to 1989, the level of decentralization increased in the opposition network as

138

Osa, Maryjane. Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition. Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 2003. pp. 164-165.
139
Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2004. pp. 143-44, 150-151.

73

the Solidarity movement inspired the development and collaboration of new institutions
that eventually grew to include over a hundred different institutions, which took a direct
role in the leadership of the movement.
Similar to the cases that Schock analyzed with umbrella organizations that led the
movement, such as Bayan in the Phillipines, the Solidarity movement in Poland was able
to increase their abilities to resist repression. The decentralization of leadership in the
opposition network in Poland meant that the Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski regimes were
unable to target a single group for repression, which is displayed in the attempt to shut
down the city blockade in Warsaw by the Jaruzelski regime in 1988 that failed since
protesters would simply replace removed protesters with new protesters in a continual
cycle. Additionally, the decentralized structure in the non-violent movement permitted
the network to continue to pressure the regime even after the imprisonment of some of its
leadership, like after the arrest of Walesa in 1982. Furthermore, the opposition network
became increasingly more democratic with the consolidation of new groups, which also
aided in the collaboration of diverse groups, since they were no longer focusing on
specific objectives, but a common goal. An example of this is the collaboration of two
groups with contradicting ideologies, like Christian and secular groups, such as the Club
of Catholic Intelligentsia and the Movement of Polish Socialists’ Accord, respectively.140
By developing a more democratic network, which worked towards a shared purpose, the
regime was unable to fracture the movement on ideological divisions.
The pro-democracy movement in Serbia also enhanced its resiliency by
implementing a decentralized leadership network that relied on a diverse group of
individuals and institutions for the coordination and organization of the major non-violent
140

Ibid., pp. 157-165.

74

campaigns and events. The organizers and leaders of events, like the September 27, 2000
protest in response to the release of election results that were in favor of Milosevic, were
drawn from an assortment of civil-society institutions, such as the student movement,
Otpor!, and the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy. The pro-democracy
movement in Serbia in 2000 was consolidated predominately into a coalition of a few
civil-society institutions, such as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Otpor!, and the
Open Society Institute, and international rights advocacy groups, like the International
Republican Institute.141 Unlike the Solidarity movement in Poland, the opposition
network in Serbia consisted of fewer civil-society institutions, as the development of new
organizations was still limited, which led to pro-democracy individuals joining one of the
more general existing civil-society institutions, instead of participating or creating in a
more focused organization. Although there were typically fewer civil-society institutions
involved in the movement, the leadership responsibilities were divided equally between
each of these groups, which also decentralized leadership within the structure of each
organization. Basically, the leadership of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was
decentralized on two levels, in the movement as a whole and throughout each
organization.
The high level of decentralization of the leadership in the pro-democracy
movement in Serbia meant that the opposition network was able to more effectively resist
repression efforts by the Milosevic regime. The decentralized nature of the opposition
network did not permit the Milosevic regime to efficiently focus repression on a
particular group, as attempts at targeting the leaders and supporters of Otpor! did not
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successfully prevent non-violent action from continuing. Additionally, the imprisonment
of members of the opposition network, especially some of the prominent members of the
opposition political parties that were part of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, had
minimal impact on the ability of the pro-democracy movement to persist. This was
possible since other and new leaders in the opposition political parties and civil-society
institutions took over the leadership responsibilities of the detained leaders, which
allowed the movement to continue non-violent action against the regime.
The cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia indicate that
decentralization of the leadership structures in opposition network can occur in different
ways, but still enable success. In Poland, the Solidarity movement consisted of numerous
civil-society institutions from both the international and domestic realms, working
closely together for a common objective. The pro-democracy movement in Serbia
combined a smaller number of civil-society institutions with a greater number of
individuals under each of those organizations. The decentralization of the leadership
structure in the two opposition networks was one of the three factors that helped enable
success in both of the cases of non-violent action. This signifies that Schock’s
hypothesis, which contends that non-violent movements that organize a decentralized
network of oppositional institutions are more likely to achieve peaceful political
transition holds true for the cases of Poland and Serbia, but only as one of the three
necessary, but not sufficient factors that enable success in non-violent action.
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Chapter 5: Leverage and Resilience in Non-violent Revolutions
5.1 Chapter Overview
The third factor that impacts a non-violent movement’s success is the leverage
and resilience capabilities of the opposition network, as it relates to the balance of power
between the movement and the government. This chapter looks at the leverage and
resilience capabilities of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia and what
impact they had on the success of the movement. In both these movements, the leverage
and resilience abilities of the opposition network helped resist repression efforts by the
government and pressure the regimes to democratize.
After an overview of Schock’s evaluation of the influence of leverage and
resilience in pro-democracy movements, this chapter examines the role of leverage and
resilience in the non-violent revolution in Poland from 1980 through 1989. The
following section analyzes the pro-democracy movement in Serbia, in terms of its
leverage and resilience abilities and the consequential impact on the movement’s success.
These sections explore the location, the non-violent method utilized, the level of
participation, and the leadership of the major non-violent campaigns and events to
determine the leverage and resilience capacity of each movement. The chapter concludes
with an overview of the impact of the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent
revolutions in Poland and Serbia and whether Schock’s theory, which attributes success
in non-violent action in part to enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities, holds true
for the two cases. The leverage and resilience abilities of a movement are determined by
numerous factors: the ability of the opposition network to coordinate and hold protests
and events in a range of locations, because it shows the ability of the movement to
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mobilize support throughout the country; the capability of the movement to utilize an
array of non-violent methods and techniques, which prevents the government from
targeting a specific method for repression; the capacity of the opposition network to
mobilize and coordinate large numbers of protesters at multiple places and events; and
the diversity of the leadership in the movement, in terms of supporters from different
organizations sharing leadership duties and responsibilities, which signifies that the
government is unable to target specific individuals in hope of disrupting the movement.
5.2 Leverage and Resilience Abilities of Non-violent Movements
According to Schock, leverage is the ability of the non-violent movement to
mobilize or withdrawal support in favor or against the government, while resilience is the
ability of the non-violent movement to resist continued repression efforts by the
government.142 Schock contends that the level of decentralization of the opposition
network, the ability to implement multiple non-violent techniques from across the three
methods of non-violent action, the ability to implement methods of dispersion as well as
methods of concentration, and tactical innovation are factors that affect the leverage and
resilience abilities of a non-violent movement. Schock contends that leverage and
resilience directly influence the power relationship between the government and the
opposition network, with the ability to shift power to either party. Schock’s principal
assertion is that if a movement has enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities, nonviolent action is more likely to succeed, since the opposition network is capable of
withdrawing popular support from the regime making it unable to effectively govern.143
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The next two sections will investigate the extent of leverage and resilience in the nonviolent movements in Poland and Serbia to determine the extent to which Schock’s
second independent variable contributed to their success.
5.3 The Impact of the Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Solidarity Movement in
Poland
The non-violent movement in Poland during the 1980’s was the target for a
variety of repression efforts by the government that included the imprisonment of
different leaders, a declaration of martial law, and the prohibition of domestic civilsociety institutions. In order to survive and prosper in spite of these repression attempts,
the non-violent movement in Poland implemented a variety of techniques and strategies
that enhanced its leverage and resilience capabilities. Starting with an overview of the
leverage and resilience capacity of the opposition network in Poland prior to 1980, this
section investigates the major non-violent campaigns and events to determine the ability
of the movement to implement strategies and techniques to enhance its leverage and
resilience abilities. By discovering the degree that the non-violent movement in Poland
was able to enhance its leverage and resilience capabilities, this section will explore the
impact of leverage and resilience on the success of the non-violent action.
Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Polish Opposition Movement Prior to 1980
In December 1970, factory workers in Gdansk, Poland protested a sudden price
increase in food and other common items, which quickly spread to neighboring cities in
Northern Poland. The strikes lasted relatively briefly, but the government responded by
sending in the government military forces, the Polish People’s Army and the Citizen’s
Militia, which opened fire on the protesters, killing approximately 40 and wounding
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thousands.144 Although the strikes turned violent and civilians were killed, multiple
Polish officials were forced to resign in order to prevent a nationwide outbreak of riots
and protests. Edward Gierek replaced W!adys!aw Gomu!ka as the Polish United Workers'
Party leader, which resulted in a reversal of policies by the Polish government that
included lowering meat prices, raising worker wages, and more changes were
promised.145 The workers who protested the raising of meat prices and wage decreases
mainly held their strikes in only a few areas, limited to Northern Poland, and did not
implement a variety of non-violent methods. The leadership of the protests was
decentralized, but only as a result of mass disorganization on the part of the strikers,
which allowed for the Polish government to eliminate the leaders in an attempt to stop the
movement. Although the government was successful in destroying the already
disorganized leadership of the protesters and halting the strikes, the protesters were
successful in temporary improving their situation. The protesters leverage and resilience
abilities were severely limited and the political change that was produced was shallow in
the sense that the results only improved the conditions in Poland for a short time period.
Six years later, in June 1976, the economy in Poland was in a more dire situation
than it was in December 1970, resulting in the announcement that the prices of all basic
food items would be raised a considerable amount, since the prices were frozen after the
1970 strikes. The announcement by Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz resulted in
nationwide outrage that led to strikes, looting, and violence across different cities in
Poland. Strikes were largely concentrated in Radom, Ursus, and Plock, but also took
place in Warsaw, Poznan, and Gdansk. An estimated 75,000 protesters in approximately
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100 factories across Poland took place in the June 1976 strikes, which resulted in shallow
political change similar to the aftermath of the 1970 strikes.146 Although the protesters
were able to mobilize a relatively large number of strikers in a short amount of time, the
opposition movement still had limited leverage and resilience capabilities, as a result of
the protests turning violent that ultimately resulted in a loss of credibility and support for
the movement. Throughout the rest of the 1970’s, the opposition movement continued to
build support structures, coalitions, and civil society institutions, while the Polish
government was content to simply avoid confrontations with the workers.
Employment of Methods of Dispersion and Concentration by the Solidarity Movement
In 1980, the pro-democracy movement in Poland implemented widespread nonviolent action in response to another increase in food prices and a decrease in worker
wages. The opposition movement organized and coordinated hundreds of thousands of
pro-democracy protesters at different events in cities all over Poland, especially in
Gdansk, Warsaw, and Lublin.147 Between July 1980 and December 1981, five major
non-violent events and campaigns took place nationwide, with participation ranging from
1,000 in the earlier strikes in the smaller cities to seven million during the third and most
successful Free Saturday strike on January 24, 1981.148 Even after the imposition of
martial law on December 31, 1981, which prohibited independent trade unions until
1985, the pro-democracy movement organized multiple strikes, protests, and other nonviolent action nationwide. From 1985 until 1989, the Solidarity movement frequently
organized numerous major non-violent campaign and events nationwide, with
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approximately 100 to 60,000 participants per event per city.149 Although the protests
were focused in Warsaw, the movement also mobilized large numbers of strikers,
protesters, and organizations to employ non-violent action in other Polish cities, such as
Gdansk, Szczecin, and Krakow.
The Implementation of a Range of Actions Across the Three Methods of Non-violent
Action
Between 1980 and 1989, the pro-democracy movement in Poland employed nonviolent action across all three methods of non-violent action, which are protest and
persuasion, noncooperation, and disruptive non-violent intervention. Between July 1980
and August 1981, the opposition movement implemented non-violent methods mostly in
the protest and persuasion and noncooperation categories. Labor strikes, social
disobedience, speeches, petitions, journals, newspapers, picketing, prayer, singing,
marches, and refusal of public support for the government were just some of the nonviolent methods utilized during this time.150 From 1981 through 1989, the Solidarity
movement employed non-violent action evenly from all three methods. In addition to the
methods listed above, the pro-democracy movement utilized marches, election boycotts,
economic boycotts, sit-ins, hunger strikes, blockades, and civil disobedience against the
Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski regimes.
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Decentralized Leadership and the Ability to Innovate Tactically
As discussed in Chapter 4, the pro-democracy movement’s leadership structure
became increasingly decentralized throughout the 1980’s, resulting in a highly
decentralized, yet organized leadership structure. The level of decentralization of the
Solidarity movement towards the end of decade is displayed through the number of
different organizations that were responsible for sponsoring or leading protests between
1980 and 1989. For example, in 1989, 314 total non-violent protest events took place
that year and over half of the events were led or sponsored by a total of at least 156
different organizations.151 The leadership of the movement was divided among numerous
political parties, labor unions, peasant/farmer organizations, interest groups,
social/political movements, and other miscellaneous organizations. Additionally, the prodemocracy’s decentralized leadership structure was able to strategically adjust their
practices to stay a step ahead of the government. The Solidarity movement continually
innovated their protest tactics and techniques, such as utilizing civil-society institutions,
like the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate (KCEP), to receive equipment and
supplies without the government’s knowledge or inspection.152
Persisting in the Face of Repression to Achieve Peaceful Political Transition
The opposition faced a variety of different challenges from the government in its
quest for a peaceful political transition. The government’s repression tactics included a
special paramilitary task force, anti-assembly legislation, a declaration of martial law, and
the official military and police forces tasked with suppressing any opposition campaigns
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or protests. In addition to multiple arrests, attempted assassinations, and mass factory
firings, the government attempted to ban the development and operation of all
independent trade unions.153 Through tactical innovation and a decentralized leadership
structure, the pro-democracy movement in Poland was able to overcome numerous
obstacles, including multiple years spent underground. Furthermore, by resisting
repression attempts by the government, the pro-democracy movement in Poland gained
support by exploiting the government’s abuse through the independent and international
media.
Conclusion
The ability of the pro-democracy movement to employ methods of dispersion and
concentration, implement a range of actions across the three methods of non-violent
action, share leadership responsibilities, tactically innovate and persist in the face of
repression indicates the Solidarity movement’s leverage and resilience capabilities. Since
the pro-democracy movement had advanced leverage and resilience abilities, it was able
to overcome and overwhelm the government through non-violent action. The opposition
movement’s leverage and resilience capacity meant that the government was unable to
target a specific group, location, action, or method, which meant that the government
could not respond accordingly to the non-violent action. The leverage and resilience
capabilities of the pro-democracy movement directly contributed to the success of the
non-violent action in Poland.
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5.4 The Role of Leverage and Resilience in the Pro-democracy Movement in Serbia
The pro-democracy movement in Serbia was met with a great deal of government
resistance, as the Milosevic regime utilized police and military forces, restrictive
legislation, and assassinations in attempts to repress the burgeoning movement. The prodemocracy movement employed an assortment of methods and strategies that boosted its
leverage and resilience capacity, in order to succeed in the face of the government’s
repression efforts. The next section provides an overview of the leverage and resilience
capabilities of the opposition network in Serbia before 1999. The following section
investigates the major non-violent campaigns and events to determine the ability of the
movement to use methods of dispersion and concentration, non-violent action from all of
the three methods of non-violent action, a decentralized leadership structure, and to
tactically innovate in order to enhance the opposition network’s leverage and resilience
abilities. By determining the ability of the non-violent movement in Serbia to improve its
leverage and resilience capabilities, this section will examine the contribution of leverage
and resilience on the success of the non-violent action.
Leverage and Resilience Abilities of the Serbian Opposition Movement Prior to 1999
Following the 1996 local elections in Serbia, the Zajedno coalition and university
students took to the streets claiming that the results of the election were fraudulent.
Although the protests achieved minor success through the official acceptance of the
election victories of the opposition parties, the coalition’s leadership was severely
fractured, which resulted in the dissolution of the group and any further protests at that
time. Additionally, the university students and the Zajedno coalition held all protests and
non-violent action separately, which meant that it was easier for the government to
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disperse, since the events were divided in participation numbers and generally less
organized.154 Prior to the beginning of the 1999 protests, the pro-democracy movement’s
leverage and resilience abilities were nominal, as a result of the disbanding of the
Zajedno coalition and the lack of organization and leadership among the university
students.155 This meant that the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was unable to
implement methods of dispersion and concentration and tactically innovate, as the action
and mobilization orders often conflicted with one another, as they were from a variety of
sources.
Employment of Methods of Dispersion and Concentration by the Pro-Democracy
Movement
After the institution of new hiring policies for the universities that required
government approval of all professor appointments in late-1998, Otpor! and other student
groups formed and began to communicate with other newly developing domestic civilsociety institutions. In mid-1999, the first few major non-violent campaigns and events
were primarily concentrated in Serbian cities with large student populations, such as Nis
and Belgrade, with approximately one-thousand participants per event. In September
1999, after a downturn in the economy, protests erupted in over twenty cities with
upwards of 15,000 participating in each city, which were primarily sponsored and led by
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Otpor! and the different opposition political parties that would eventually form the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia.156
Between October 1999 and September 2000, most of the major non-violent
campaigns and events were held in or around Belgrade, with participation numbers
ranging from 1,000 to 100,000 at each event. Although the protests primarily took place
in Belgrade, the pro-democracy movement managed to continually mobilize supporters in
a variety of locations in Belgrade simultaneously. During the last week of the protests,
between September 27 and October 5, DOS, Otpor!, and several other domestic and
international non-governmental organizations coordinated protests, strikes, and other
forms of non-violent across all major cities in Serbia. Approximately 10,000 to 100,000
people attended each event, with the total rising to 500,000 on October 5, 2000, when the
pro-democracy movement implemented waves of general strikes, sit-ins, and marches,
which resulted in a complete shutdown of official operations, including official police
and military forces. The varying locations and high participation numbers display the
ability of the pro-democracy movement in Serbia to employ methods of dispersion and
concentration.157
The Implementation of a Range of Actions Across the Three Methods of Non-violent
Action
The pro-democracy movement in Serbia organized and led a variety of creative
non-violent campaigns and events that contributed to the peaceful ousting of President
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Slobodan Milosevic. Otpor! developed innovative and interesting non-violent campaigns
and event that not only gained the media and the public’s attention, but also the attention
of the government. The pro-democracy movement utilized unique events, such as a
mock birthday party for Milosevic that included gifts designed for his inevitable
incarceration and rock concert rallies and tours that helped spread the pro-democracy
message to the Serbian youth.158 Additionally, Otpor! used new technology and diverse
mediums, such as websites, email, t-shirts, stickers, posters, and banners to circulate
announcements, messages, slogans, and plans. In addition to the more unique nonviolent methods utilized, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia also used traditional
non-violent action, such as rallies, marches, protests, demonstrations, strikes, and sitins.159 Throughout the non-violent campaign against the Milosevic regime, the prodemocracy movement in Serbia implemented non-violent action from the protest and
persuasion, noncooperation, and disruptive and creative non-violent intervention
classifications of non-violent methods. Since the pro-democracy movement in Serbia
used both new and traditional non-violent methods, the government was unable to target
a particular method or event to focus its repression efforts on.
Decentralized Leadership and the Ability to Innovate Tactically
The pro-democracy movement in Serbia enhanced its resiliency by implementing
a decentralized leadership network that relied on a diverse group of individuals and
institutions for the coordination and organization of the major non-violent campaigns and
events. The organizers and leaders of events, like the September 27, 2000, protest in
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response to the release of election results that were in favor of Milosevic, were drawn
from an assortment of civil-society institutions, such as the student movement, Otpor!,
and the Centre for Free Elections and Democracy. The pro-democracy movement in
Serbia was consolidated predominately into a coalition of a few civil-society institutions,
such as the Democratic Opposition of Serbia, Otpor!, and the Open Society Institute, and
international rights advocacy groups, like the International Republican Institute.160
Although there were typically less civil-society institutions involved in the movement,
the leadership responsibilities were divided equally between each of these groups, which
also decentralized leadership within the structure of each organization. The decentralized
nature of the opposition network did not permit the Milosevic regime to efficiently focus
repression on a particular group, as attempts at targeting the leaders and supporters of
Otpor! did not successfully prevent non-violent action from continuing. Additionally, the
imprisonment of members of the opposition network, especially some of the prominent
members of the opposition political parties that were part of the Democratic Opposition
of Serbia, had minimal impact on the ability of the pro-democracy movement to
persist.161 This was possible since other and new leaders in the opposition political
parties and civil-society institutions took over the leadership responsibilities of the
detained leaders, which allowed the movement to continue non-violent action against the
regime.
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Persisting in the Face of Repression to Achieve Peaceful Political Transition
The opposition movement in Serbia faced multiple obstacles from the Milosevic
regime that it needed to overcome to achieve a peaceful political transition. The Serbian
government utilized several repression methods and policies to control the non-violent
action, including imprisonment, blackmail, harassment, and restrictive curfew and
assembly laws. In addition to multiple arrests, attempted assassinations, and mass
university expulsions, the government attempted to ban the organization of new domestic
civil-society institutions.162 Through tactical innovation and a decentralized leadership
structure, the pro-democracy movement in Serbia was able to succeed in the face of
repression. Furthermore, by resisting repression attempts by the government, the prodemocracy movement gained support by exploiting the government’s cruelty through
international media and organizations.
Conclusion
The ability of the pro-democracy movement to implement methods of dispersion
and concentration, utilize a range of actions across the three methods of non-violent
action, lead cooperatively, tactically innovate and persist in the face of repression
displays that the pro-democracy movement in Serbia had enhanced leverage and
resilience capabilities. Since the pro-democracy movement had an advanced leverage
and resilience capacity, it was able to overcome and overwhelm the Milosevic regime
through non-violent action. The opposition movement’s leverage and resilience
capabilities signified that the regime was unable to target a specific organization,
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location, event, or technique, which meant that the government could not respond
accordingly to the non-violent action. The leverage and resilience capabilities of the prodemocracy movement directly contributed to the success of the non-violent action.
5.5 Conclusion
The pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia both improved their
leverage and resilience abilities, which directly contributed to the movements’ success.
The non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia strengthened their leverage and
resilience capabilities by implementing methods of dispersion and concentration,
employing methods from all the three categories of non-violent action, decentralizing
leadership, tactically innovating, and by mobilizing and/or withdrawing support for the
government. The enhanced leverage and resilience capacity of the non-violent
movements in Poland and Serbia aided the ability of the opposition networks to avoid
and/or overcome government repression efforts. The governments were unable to
effectively target military and police forces, policies, and other repression efforts on a
specific event, location, organization, or non-violent method. Since the non-violent
movements in Poland and Serbia avoided direct pressure from the governments, the
opposition networks in both countries grew larger and more powerful. The Solidarity
movement in Poland and the pro-democracy movement in Serbia used anti-government
sentiment due to other social and economic factors, especially from the price increase on
food in Poland and the NATO bombing of Serbia, to gain momentum and greater support
from citizens and international and domestic non-governmental organizations. The
growing anti-government sentiment in Serbia contributed to halting the governments’

91

operation because the citizens were becoming less obedient to the regimes, signifying
that the governments no longer had enough support to enforce their policies.163
The cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia demonstrate that
enhanced leverage and resilience ability enable success in non-violent revolutions. In
Poland, the Solidarity movement held campaigns and events in a variety of locations,
utilized diverse non-violent methods, especially factory sit-ins and the Free Saturday
strikes that brought the entire country to a standstill. Additionally, the pro-democracy
movement in Poland shared logistical and planning responsibilities in order to prevent the
government from successfully targeting an individual or an organization and used its
power to mobilize or withdraw support from the government by eliminating the
obedience of the citizens that the government relied on. Similarly, the pro-democracy
movement in Serbia organized nationwide campaign and events, used unique and creative
non-violent techniques, decentralized leadership, and capitalized on current events, like
the NATO bombing of Serbia and the economic crisis, to place overpowering political
pressure on the Milosevic regime. The enhanced leverage and resilience capacity of the
opposition networks was one of the three factors that helped enable success in both of the
cases of non-violent action, which means that Schock’s hypothesis holds true for this
factor in the cases of Poland and Serbia.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
6.1 Findings
This thesis examined the non-violent revolutions in Poland in 1989 and Serbia in
2000 in context of the three factors that political scientist Kurt Schock hypothesized as
enabling success in non-violent action: links between domestic and international civilsociety institutions and the opposition network, decentralized leadership in the opposition
network, and enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities. To determine whether or not
these factors aided the success of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia, this
study investigated factors including the role of non-governmental organizations in the
pro-democracy movements, leadership of the major non-violent campaigns and events,
and the ability of the opposition network to enhance its leverage and resilience capacity
through tactical innovation, avoiding repression, and utilizing diverse non-violent
methods.
In the cases of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia, domestic and
international civil-society institutions provided valuable financial support, international
media attention, and additional participants to the pro-democracy movements. In Poland,
domestic organizations like Solidarity, the Charitable Commission of the Episcopate
(KCEP), and the Workers' Defense Committee (KOR), along with transnational nongovernmental organizations, such as the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the
Polish-American Congress (PAC), and Pomost, contributed money, technology, and
other resources that strengthened the operational abilities of the opposition network.164
Similarly, in Serbia, domestic civil-society institutions, such as Otpor!, the Open Society
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Institute and Center for Free Elections and Democracy (CESID), in addition to
international NGOs like Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the International
Republican Institute (IRI), provided training, financial and material resources, and realtime reports of the non-violent action and the Milosevic regime’s responses. The support
provided by domestic and international civil-society institutions enabled the non-violent
movements in Poland and Serbia to hold major non-violent campaigns and events that
helped pressure the governments.
The pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia shared logistical and
planning responsibilities among a variety of individuals, organizations, and coalitions,
which made it more difficult for the government to target a specific person or group for
banishment, imprisonment, or even assassination. The non-violent movement in Poland
utilized a decentralized leadership structure in the form of an umbrella organization,
Solidarity, which acted as the primary coordinator for several autonomous domestic and
international organizations. The Serbian non-violent movement also used decentralized
leadership, but in the form of a few civil-society institutions, such as Otpor! and the
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).165 The non-violent movements’ decentralized
leadership structures helped the opposition networks avoid government repression efforts,
as the governments were unable to target specific individuals or organizations. When
leaders such as Lech Walesa were imprisoned, or groups such as Solidarity prohibited,
the non-violent movements persisted underground due to financial and material
assistance provided by international organizations, such as Pomost. The ability of the
pro-democracy movements in Poland and Serbia to continue normal operations by
165
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persisting through the imprisonment, blacklisting, and/or assassination of their leaders
signifies that the use of decentralized leadership structure of the movements contributed
to the success of the non-violent action.
The opposition networks in Poland and Serbia actively enhanced their leverage
and resilience abilities by employing methods of dispersion and concentration,
implementing non-violent action from each of the three categorizations of non-violent
methods, using decentralized leadership, and persisting in the face of repression. The
Solidarity movement coordinated major campaigns and events throughout Poland,
implemented a wide range of non-violent methods and strategies, decentralized
leadership, and overcame repression by the Jab!o"ski and Jaruzelski regimes. In Serbia,
the pro-democracy movement held non-violent action in cities across Serbia, employed
creative and unique forms of non-violent action, decentralized leadership, and continued
to pressure the Milosevic regime, even after numerous imprisonments and assassinations.
These steps taken by the Polish and Serbian opposition networks enhanced their leverage
and resilience abilities, which made it difficult for the governments to respond
accordingly. The enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities of the pro-democracy
movements in Poland and Serbia provided the opposition networks with the strength to
increase pressure on the government, bringing government operations, including
economic institutions and legislative bodies, to a standstill.
Schock’s three factors, a link between civil-society institutions and the
challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and leverage and resilience abilities,
each played an important role in enabling success in non-violent movements. Schock’s
first two factors, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers and a
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decentralized leadership structure, are the two largest contributing factors in terms of the
non-violent movements enhancing their leverage and resilience. Additionally, each of
the factors were necessary to enable success in non-violent action, but not sufficient to
enable success independently. Furthermore, Schock’s first factor, a link between civilsociety institutions and the challengers in a non-violent movement was directly connected
to Schock’s second factor, a decentralized leadership structure, because the addition of
domestic and international non-governmental organizations to the non-violent
movements aided the decentralization of the opposition networks in Poland and Serbia, as
detailed in Chapter 4. In addition to the connection between Schock’s first and second
factors, the second factor, a decentralized leadership structure is directly connected to
Schock’s third factor, leverage and resilience, because decentralized leadership structures
enhanced the leverage and resilience capabilities of the non-violent movements in Poland
and Serbia. The use of decentralized leadership structures in Poland and Serbia signifies
that the governments were unable to target a specific individual or organization, which
also meant that the opposition networks were able to continue normal operations when
leaders were imprisoned or assassinated. Schock’s third factor, leverage and resilience,
seemed to have the greatest impact comparatively, as Schock’s first and second factors
helped improve the leverage and resilience abilities of the non-violent movements in
Poland and Serbia.
This thesis concludes that in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland in
1989 and Serbia in 2000 that a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers,
a decentralized leadership structure, and enhanced leverage and resilience capabilities
enabled success for the non-violent action. The pro-democracy movements utilized these
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factors to overpower the governments’ military and police forces, restrictive policies, and
resources to produce political transition. Although the non-violent movements in Poland
and Serbia capitalized on the political, economic, and social crises that were plaguing
both countries, the main impact of these factors was that they increased participation and
support for the pro-democracy movements. Schock’s hypothesis that a link between
civil-society institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and
enhanced leverage and resilience abilities enables success in non-violent action proves
true for the cases of the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia.
6.2 Limitations
Schock’s three factors that were examined in this research, in context of the nonviolent movements in Poland and Serbia, are considered necessary, but not sufficient
factors in enabling success in non-violent action. This signifies that links between civilsociety institutions and challengers in a non-violent movement, decentralized leadership
structures, and resilience and leverage were not influential enough to enable success
individually, but their presence was required as a whole for non-violent action to succeed.
In other words, this thesis discovered that Schock’s three factors were necessary, but not
sufficient causes only in the cases of the non-violent movements in Poland and Serbia,
which means that this research is unable to prove if any of the three factors are adequate
to enable success on their own for all cases. Findings in this research and Schock’s
Unarmed Insurrections can only indicate that in non-violent action, a link between civilsociety institutions and the challengers, a decentralized leadership structure, and
enhanced leverage and resilience abilities are more likely to be found in cases of
successful non-violent action. These two cases, combined with Schock’s six cases
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display that assistance from external factors and political opportunities is also beneficial
in enabling success, but it is difficult to assess to what extent it plays a role.
The main limitation of this study is that it only tested a small number (n) of cases,
as a means of providing insight and supplying further hypotheses for testing, as opposed
to proving or disproving a certain theory. Due to time and resource limits, this study
investigated two successful cases of non-violent action, instead of a multitude of cases
involving successes and failures. This small-n study does not attempt to prove Schock’s
hypothesis true for all cases of non-violent action, but that they were present and/or
influential in the cases of Poland and Serbia, which can add to the six cases that Schock
tested in his research. Two successful cases of non-violent action were chosen since this
research is designed to explore whether Schock’s factors, if present, enable success, as
opposed to determining whether they also cause failure when absent. This signifies that
this research is unable to prove whether these factors are necessary for success in all
cases of non-violent action. This research hopes that other contemporary and historical
cases of non-violent action, both successful and unsuccessful, will be analyzed in terms
of Schock’s hypothesis. Further research is necessary to provide a definitive answer to
whether Schock’s hypothesis proves true for all cases of non-violent action, which could
provide an important framework for enabling success in non-violent movements.
6.3 Implications for future research
In addition to providing insight into whether Schock’s hypothesis proves true in
the cases of the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia, this thesis was also designed to
help suggest further hypotheses for testing. While researching for this thesis, I
discovered an intriguing aspect of non-violent opposition networks, which fits with

98

Schock’s first factor, a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers. I
discovered that several non-violent opposition organizations have aided other non-violent
organizations in different countries, providing resources, literature, and hands-on nonviolent training. The intriguing aspect of this discovery is that non-violent opposition
networks appear to act similarly to global terrorist networks, but with different motives,
as terrorist groups provide training and materials for financial benefit, whereas nonviolent groups like Otpor! are primarily interested in eliminating authoritarian regimes.
For example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) has been involved in providing material
resources and training to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),166 while
non-violent groups like Otpor! (now CANVAS) have provided training and resources to
other international pro-democracy movements, such as the anti-Chavez movement in
Venezuela in 2002.167 This thesis suggests that further research could test the
contribution of experienced non-violent institutions and leadership to new non-violent
movements.
Another interesting aspect of the non-violent action in Poland and Serbia was the
difference in the average age of the movement and the types of non-violent methods
utilized by each group. The Solidarity movement was primarily comprised of middleaged working-class people and employed more traditional methods of non-violent action,
such as strikes and sit-ins, while the pro-democracy movement in Serbia, which was
primarily youth-based, used creative methods of non-violent action and technology more
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frequently. This thesis suggests that further research could also test whether the age of
the movement influences the types of non-violent methods used by that group.
6.4 Conclusion
According to Schock, “we need an accurate understanding of what non-violent
action is, and we need social scientific analyses of non-violent action that neither
romanticize it, on the one hand, nor dismiss its power and potential, on the other.”168
Schock’s three factors; a link between civil-society institutions and the challengers,
decentralized leadership, and enhanced leverage and resilience abilities enabled success
for the non-violent revolutions in Poland and Serbia. Although it is still only a
beginning, this research could be used as part of a more comprehensive study that could
discover a definitive answer on the impact of Schock’s three factors on enabling success
in non-violent action.
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Appendix 1: Organizations involved in the non-violent movement in Poland, 19801989
Organization

Acronym

Solidarity

SOL

Rural
Solidarity

SRI

Domestic
(Poland)

Group against
Job
Discrimination
Movement of
Free
Democrats
Independent
SelfGoverning
Union of
Teachers and
Educational
Employees
Workers'
National
Movement

GAB

Domestic
(Poland)

RWD

Domestic
(Poland)

ZNP

Domestic
(Poland)

RRN

Domestic
(Poland)

ROP

Domestic
(Poland)

WZZ

Domestic
(Poland)

KPK

Domestic
(Poland)

TKN

Domestic
(Poland)

Movement for
Defense of
Human and
Civic Rights
Free Trade
Unions
Civic
Committee to
Build a
Monument in
Honor of
Victims of
Katyn
Society of
Scientific
Courses

Type
(International
or Domestic)
Domestic
(Poland)

Actions
Responsible for the coordination and organization of the
opposition, as most opposition groups cooperated with
them. They were responsible for the leadership, as a
collective entity, for the domestic leadership of most of the
major sit-ins, strikes, demonstrations, and blockades. Also
responsible for the management of all funds received from
domestic and international donors that was used for a
variety of purposes, from printing resources to medical aid.
Organized and led strikes and sit-ins by the Polish farmers,
also worked with Solidarity to publish pro-democracy
papers and posters to spread information.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, worked to protect Polish
citizens against being discriminated for jobs if they were
not sympathizers of the Polish regime.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, held Poland government
accountable for policies agreed upon in Helsinki Accords,
reported and organized protests for this cause.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, Teacher's group that formed
to protect the interests of Teachers and educational
employees, since the Polish government was trying to gain
greater control over school system, organized and
coordinated teachers and other employees across all of
Poland to protest/strike against the regime.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, working-class group, antiSoviet nationalists, brought new and more members into
the movement, as it was first truly nationalist group in
Solidarity.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, contact with Poles abroad,
published 3 movement periodicals and acted as grassroots
organizers, and created "free discussion" clubs to get
students and other people involved in the movement.
Created prior to Solidarity, then merged under Solidarity's
umbrella, but leader of 1980 Lenin Shipyard strikes,
produced papers and organized workers against the
government.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added
general assistance to the movement, such as providing
protesters and spreading information.

Under Solidarity's umbrella, hosted courses designed to
"stimulate unfettered discussion on sensitive topics" in
different locations across the country, to avoid repression,
created competing political and cultural analyses.
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Clubs in
Service of
Independence
Committee
Accord for
National
Independence
Young Poland
Movement

KSN

Domestic
(Poland)

PSN

Domestic
(Poland)

RMP

Domestic
(Poland)

Workers'
Defense
Committee

KOR

Domestic
(Poland)

The Sign

ZNK

Domestic
(Poland)

Polish
Independence
Accord

PPN

Domestic
(Poland)

Confederation
for
Independent
Poland

KPN

Domestic
(Poland)

Universal
Weekly

TGP

Domestic
(Poland)

Club of
Catholic
Intelligentsia

KIK

Domestic
(Poland)

Link

WEZ

Domestic
(Poland)

National
Catholic Union

ZNA

Domestic
(Poland)

Independent
Association of
Students
Movement of
Polish
Socialists'
Accord

NZS

Domestic
(Poland)

RPS

Domestic
(Poland)

Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added
general assistance to the movement, such as providing
protesters and spreading information.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added
general assistance to the movement, such as providing
protesters and spreading information.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group that added
general assistance to the movement, such as providing
protesters and spreading information aimed at the Polish
youth.
Precursor to Solidarity, first major opposition civil-society
group, sought reinstatements of fired employees, release of
prisoners, coordinated the delivery of aid, advertised
situation to West for funding, and led/organized protests.
Core Catholic Organization, published journals, primarily
focusing on philosophical discussions, contributed
members to newly formed NGOs, as they were already a
developed and cohesive group, and eventually became part
of Solidarity movement.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, acted to change foreign policy
and improve freedom of speech, closely linked with
Catholic NGOs, and used publications to spread beliefs,
also shared members with other groups.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, nationalist group, right-wing
radicals, organized and coordinated demonstrations,
wanted credit to pull pressure away from KOR being
repressed. Also acted as intellectual leaders for many of
the events.
One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream
Catholic, voiced opinions through periodical, one of the
core organizations of the movement, provided protesters,
resources, and leadership to the movement, came under
Solidarity.
One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream
Catholic, sponsored community lectures, language classes,
excursions. Acted to socialize opposition writers and
artists. Eventually came under Solidarity's umbrella.
One of the oldest opposition groups, also mainstream
Catholic, voiced opinions through periodical, one of the
core organizations of the movement, provided protesters,
resources, and leadership to the movement, came under
Solidarity.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, mainstream Catholic, but also
nationalist, one of the core Catholic organizations of the
movement, provided protesters, resources, and leadership
to the movement.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, student group that added
general assistance to the movement, such as providing
protesters and spreading information.
Under Solidarity's umbrella, leftist group that added
general assistance to the movement, such as providing
resources and protesters, and spreading information.
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Roman
Catholic
Church

Holy See

International
(Vatican)

Charitable
Commission of
the Episcopate

KCEP

Domestic
(Poland)

Church World
Services

CWS

International
(America)

Lutheran
World Relief

LWR

International
(America)

American
Federation of
Labor and
Congress of
Industrial
Organizations

AFL-CIO

International
(America)

Zeszyty
Literackie

ZL

International
(France)

Free Trade
Union Institute

FTUI

International
(Europe)

International
Rescue
Committee
SmithRichardson
Foundation
National
Endowment
for Democracy

IRC

International
(America)

SRF

International
(America)

NED

International
(America)

ANEKS

International
(England)

ANEKS
Publishing

Provided an international voice for the movement, as the
Pope sent out political messages in favor of the opposition,
and the Vatican permitted parish vans and buses to be used
for transportation to protests and then to be used in the
blockade of Warsaw. Pope also called for greater
assistance to the movement, especially food, medical, and
financial donations.
Used networks of parishes spread out in all areas to
efficiently disperse aid and resources, used to circumvent
aid having to go through government, mostly provided
medical equipment and clothing.
Sent blankets, quilts, clothing, soap, and water cleansing
pills, among a variety of other resources to the Polish
opposition movement.
Sent blankets, quilts, clothing, soap, and water cleansing
pills, among a variety of other resources to the Polish
opposition movement.
Provided funds to Solidarity for office/publishing supplies
and also sent funds to groups that they felt were
underfunded by Solidarity. Also worked to promote
human rights in Poland and sent a large amount of
technology that opposition could use, such as voice and
cassette recorders, extra tapes, transistor, two-way, and
short wave radios, mobile and base station antennas, and
other types of communication equipment.
Small opposition literary journal that was published both
for Polish immigrant and to be smuggled back into Poland,
containing information about past and upcoming protests
and actions.
Financial middleman. Funds were given to FTUI to
forward to the proper Polish groups to help affected
workers and keep certain organizations and offices
operating.
Provided financial and material aid to political prisoners
and their families throughout the movement.
Private group that provided grants that were used to send
parcels to jailed opposition members that were hidden in
care packages.
Funded underground/opposition publishers, PLDF,
PHWC, cultural programs banned/limited by the
government, and provided funding for the
production/distribution of video resources across Poland,
including independent theater shows, lectures from the
Flying University, special political events, banned films,
and opposition/instructional documentaries. Also acted as
intermediary for majority of funds provided by the US
government that went to the opposition movement.
Supported by NED funds, translated and published works
for Western audiences and also published underground
literature that was smuggled into Poland.

108

Aurora
Foundation

Aurora

International
(America)

Uncensored
Polish News
Bulletin
Freedom
House

PNB

International
(England)

FH

International
(America)

CARE
International
Catholic Relief
Services

CARE

International
(America)
International
(America)

Polish
American
Congress
Charitable
Foundation,
Inc.
Radio Free
Europe

PACCF

International
(America)

RFE

International
(Europe)

Project Hope

Hope

International
(America)

Pomost

Pomost

International
(America)

Polish
American
Congress

PAC

International
(America)

Polish Legal
Defense Fund

PLDF

Both (Poland
and America)

CRS

Polish Helsinki PHWC
Watch
Committee
POLCUL
POLCUL

International
(Finland)
International
(Australia)

Responsible for administering the funds to the different
organizations in the opposition movement provided by the
NED, primarily to the Polish Legal Defense Fund.
Supported by NED funds, translated and published works
for Western audiences and also published underground
literature that was smuggled into Poland.
Responsible for administering the funds to the different
organizations in the opposition movement provided by
NED and Marshall Fund.
Provided 120,000 tons of aid worth $60 million to Polish
opposition through public and private donations.
Between 1981 and 1985 CRS was responsible for 266,000
tons of aid worth $188 million, including food, medical,
and other general resources, which were sent directly to
aid the Polish opposition.
"Administers relief, rehabilitation, disaster assistance,
welfare, medical equipment and supplies, and training on
behalf of the Polish people. Since 1981, when Solidarity
was formed, the PACCF has provided medical assistance
in the form of equipment, supplies, medicines and medical
books, food and agricultural supplies (such as seeds)."
Closely followed and reported the situation in Poland
internationally, including interviews with opposition
leaders. Spread awareness of major events, people, and
places of the struggle, including responses from the
regime.
Sent 100,000 tons of medical equipment worth $23 million
to Polish opposition, mainly consisting of medical aid and
equipment.
Collected funds, published a Polish-American periodical,
organized protests/demonstrations, lobbied congress, led
Polish-American coalition in support of Solidarity
movement, tried to attract attention of important
international officials.
Collected over 5 million dollars and 122 million dollars
worth of relief goods between 1981-1988 that was sent to
the Polish opposition, organized protests/demonstrations.
August 1980 had 100,000 demonstrators in Chicago.
Lobbied Congress.
Provided legal advice and support to pro-democracy
protesters and strikers on trial. All services provided Pro
Bono, as funding came from grants and donations.
Research/Published scholarly reports on situation in
Poland, especially concerning human rights and murders
by police and military forces.
Provided awards of about $500 every year to Polish artists,
writers, journalists, lawyers, actors, intellectuals, and
scientists. Designed to advance Polish culture
internationally.

Note: Based on Bernstein (1992), Ekiert (2001), Goodwyn (1991), Kidder (1981), Labedz (1984), Osa (2003), Schock (2004), and
Francisco: European Protest and Coercion Data.
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Appendix 2: Organizations involved in the non-violent movement in Serbia, 19992000
Organization

Acronym

Otpor!

Otpor!

Democratic
Opposition of
Serbia
Open Society
Institute

DOS

Domestic
(Serbia)

OSI

Domestic
(Serbia)

Open Society
Institute

OSI

International
(America)

Drevni Telegraf

Drevni

Domestic
(Serbia)

Boom 93

Boom 93

Domestic
(Serbia)

Red Star
Belgrade Fans
ANEM Media
Network

RSB

Domestic
(Serbia)
Domestic
(Serbia)

International
Republic
Institute
Albert Einstein
Institute

ANEM

Type
(International
or Domestic)
Domestic
(Serbia)

IRI

International
(America)

(None)

International
(America)

Cable News
Network

CNN

International
(America)

Human Rights
Watch

HRW

International
(America)

Center for Free
Elections and
Democracy

CESID

Domestic
(Serbia)

Actions
Independent civil-society institution, but acted as umbrella
organization for all who wanted to get involved.
Organized/led most major events/campaigns, such as the
Birthday part, rallies, and the "He's Finished" Campaign
Coalition of 18 opposition political parties, unified with
Otpor!. Planned and organized rallies, campaigns, and
election monitoring.
Started working with students at the University of
Belgrade in 1998, teaching them about non-violent
methods, global democracy, and human-rights campaigns.
Sent funding and materials to start and operate OSI
Belgrade, continued throughout movement, provided
access to greater resources on non-violent action
Former Milosevic ally, began to print anti-Milosevic
newsletters accusing Milosevic of establishing a "criminal
autocracy" and printed materials for Otpor!, such as "Live
the Resistance," the groups first manifesto.
Illegal radio station broadcasting in Pozarevac, Serbia,
developed into local Otpor! Cell, and used airways to
spread protest information, and news for everyone,
especially about the pro-regime strong arm actions of
Marko Milosevic
Gave Belgrade protesters devices to monitor police radio
transmissions.
Organized pro-democracy rock tour in 25 Serbian cities,
using music to tell the audience it was their responsibility
to act for democracy.
US NGO provided funds for movement, established
contacts for Otpor!, and helped set up the movement with
additional funding from different countries and NGOs.
Provided, through Helvey and Sharp, the philosophical and
political foundation for the movements by speaking
appearances and communicating with the leaders of the
movement.
Closely covered the movement and the regime's response
from approximately 1998 to Milosevic's overthrow,
provided movement with greater domestic and
international attention.
Reported on the multiple human-rights violations by the
regime against the organizations, leaders, and nonparticipants, helped report internationally and attract
attention to the violations of human rights in the country.
Operated training program for thousands of election
monitors to eliminate/detect fraud at polls.
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OK98

OK98

International
(Slovakia)

Rock Volieb

(None)

Domestic
(Serbia)

German
Marshall Fund
of the US
National
Endowment for
Democracy
Amnesty
International

(None)

International
(America)

Leader of non-partisan Exit 2000 and Vreme Je
campaigns, to get everybody out to vote. Helped to get
people to understand the importance of their vote, actually
provided transportation and other means so that people
could go vote.
Leader of non-partisan Exit 2000 and Vreme Je
campaigns, to get everybody out to vote. Helped to get
people to understand the importance of their vote, actually
provided transportation and other means so that people
could go vote.
Provided a large amount of funds to the movement,
especially for the Exit 2000 campaign.

NED

International
(America)

One of three American NGO's responsible for donating
"several million dollars" that went to Otpor!.

AI

International
(America)

Institute for
War and Peace
Reporting

IWPR

Freedom House

FH

United States
Institute of
Peace

USIP

International
(America) and
Domestic
(Serbia)
International
(America)
International
(America)

Helped Serbian conscientious objectors flee conscription
from JNA and provided legal services to refugees
attempting to escape Serbia, such as Bojan Aleksov.
Reported during and after about the results of the protest
events, specifically the number of arrests that occurred
after each event led by Otpor!

Exit 2000

Exit 2000

Domestic
(Serbia)

Humanitarian
Law Foundation

HLF

Domestic
(Serbia)

Provided funding, printed materials, and monitored all
protests and events and reported back to American
Monitored institutional structures of both the opposition
and the regime, and kept the opposition informed
regarding institutional considerations if/when they would
take power from Milosevic.
Collective of civil society groups, focused on those
disconnected from politics, made/spread leaflets, posters,
T-shits, hats across the country, trying to persuade more
people to the movement.
Provided legal advice to thousands of protests, especially
Otpor! Activists after their offices were raided by the
military/police.

Note: Based on Collin (2009), Lazic (1999), Ramet (2005), and Schock (2004).
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Appendix 3: Major Non-violent Action Campaigns and Events in Poland, 1980-1989
Method of
Non-violent
Action

Leader(s)/
Organizer(s)

Third-Party
Participation

Number of
Participants

July 1980 August
1980

Initially
Northern
Poland, then
Gdansk,
Lublin,
Warsaw, and
then
nationwide

Protest and
Persuasion,
noncooperation

Initially no clear
leadership,
August 16, 1980
Inter-factory
Strike
Committee
formed. Leads
strikes.

Minimal at
beginning,
increased
gradually as
strikes
continued.

Protests range
between 1,000
and 200,000
Participants

1-hour
warning strike
for pay raises

October 3,
1980

Nationwide

Protest and
Persuasion,
noncooperation

Solidarity

Moderate, but
still active.

300,000
nationwide

Free Saturday
Strike

January 24,
1981

Nationwide

Protest and
Persuasion,
noncooperation

General AntiGovernment
Strikes

January 28,
1981 February 6,
1981

Nationwide

Protest and
Persuasion,
noncooperation

Protests and
City Blockade

August 3,
1981 August 6,
1981

Warsaw

Nonviolent
intervention:
Disruptive

Solidarity

Underground
rallies and
protests

May 1,
1982 - May
3, 1982

Primarily
Warsaw and
Gdansk, but
also in some
other cities

Protest and
persuasion

Solidarity
(underground)

August 31,
1982

Nationwide

Protest and
persuasion

Solidarity
(underground)

Moderate
involvement,
support for
Solidarity while
underground

30,000 per city

October,
1982

Gdansk

Nonviolent
intervention:
Disruptive

Solidarity
(underground)

Minimal
participation.

Ranges between
1,000 and
30,000 strikers

Action

Date

Location(s)

Strikes: after
meat prices are
raised, then
spread to
wages and
right to strike.

AntiGovernment
demonstrations
on Gdansk
Agreement
anniversary
Lenin
Shipyard
Strikes
(including
hunger strikes)

Solidarity

Solidarity

Elections
Protests

June 20,
1984

Warsaw

Protest and
persuasion

Solidarity
(underground)

Sejm Election
Boycotts

October 18,
1985

Warsaw

Nonviolent
intervention:
Disruptive

Solidarity
(underground)

First wave of
nationwide
strikes

April, 1988
May, 1988

Started in
Gdansk
Shipyard,
spread
nationwide

Protest and
persuasion
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Solidarity

Moderate
participation,
provided
resources to
spread action
Moderate
participation,
provided
resources to
protesters
Heavy
participation,
provided
resources and
support
Increased
involvement,
especially from
Catholic Civil
Society
Institutions

Heavy
involvement,
provided
transportation,
resources, and
information
Heavy
participation,
primarily by
human rights
orgs and the
Catholic Church
Heavy
participation,
primarily by
human rights
orgs and the
Catholic Church

Approximately
7,000,000
workers
Estimated
between 1,000
and 250,000
participants per
protest
Approximately
between 3,000
and 100,000
participants
Estimated
between 3,000
and 60,000 per
event

Varied reports
put estimates
between 100
and 1,000

Approximately
5,000
participants

Between 3,000
and 16,000
participants per
strike

Second wave
of nationwide
strikes

August,
1988

Started in
Warsaw,
rapidly spread
nationwide

Protest and
Persuasion,
Noncooperation,
and Nonviolent
intervention:
Disruptive

Solidarity and
the Catholic
Church

Heavy
participation by
civil society
groups

1,000 - 10,000
participants per
event

March through
February,
Protest and
Lech Walesa,
non-active
city centre
Szczecin
40,000
1989
Persuasion
Solidarity
participants
(Great March)
Note: Based on Bernstein (1992), Ekiert (2001), Goodwyn (1991), Kidder (1981), Labedz (1984), Osa (2003), Schock (2004), and
Francisco: European Protest and Coercion Data.
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Appendix 4: Major Non-violent Action Campaigns and Events in Serbia, 1999-2000
Action
Antigovernment
protests
"Birthday
Party" for
Milosevic
Serbian
economy
protests
Hospital march
to see wounded
protesters

Date

Location(s)

Method of
Non-violent
Action

Leader(s)/
Organizer(s)

Third-Party
Participation

Number of
Participants

June, 1999

Belgrade

Protest and
persuasion

Otpor!

Minimal

1,000

August, 1999

Nis

Protest and
persuasion

Otpor!

Minimal

2,000

September,
1999

20 cities

Protest and
persuasion

Fragmented
Leadership

Moderate

10,000 15,000 per city

October, 1999

Belgrade

Protest and
persuasion

Democratic
Party, led by
Zoran Djindjic

Minimal

7,000

2,500

1,000 +

Rock Concert
Rally

November,
1999

Belgrade

Protest and
persuasion

Otpor!

High level of
involvement in
concert/rally,
provided
resources and
activists

Orthodox New
Year rally

January 13,
2000

Belgrade

Protest and
persuasion

Opposition
politicians and
Otpor!

Minimal

Political
Opponents and
Otpor!

Anti-Milosevic
Regime
protests,

April, 2000

Belgrade

Protest and
Persuasion,
Nonviolent
Intervention:
Disruptive and
Creative

Protests
demonstrations

May, 2000

Nationwide

Protest and
persuasion

Democratic
Opposition of
Serbia (DOS)
and Otpor!

May 27, 2000

Belgrade

Protest and
persuasion

DOS, Otpor!

July 17, 2000

Belgrade

Protest and
persuasion

Otpor!

Protest of
University
Closing
This is the face
of Serbia
Campaign

"He's finished"
campaign.

August, 2000

Belgrade

Noncooperation,
Protest and
persuasion

DOS, Otpor!

Protest for
Milosevic's
resignation in
response to
election
outcome

Sept. 27, 2000

Belgrade and
other cities

Noncooperation,
Protest and
persuasion

DOS, Otpor!
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High level of
involvement,
provided
resources,
spread
information,
transported
activists.
High level of
involvement,
provided
resources,
spread
information,
transported
activists.
Minimal
Moderate: Nonactive
participants.
Heavy
involvement,
provided
strategy,
material, and
financial
resources
Extremely
involved,
mobilized
people, poll
monitors,
transportations,
money,
leadership, etc.

100,000

Average of
20,000 per day
over multiple
days

1,000 +
1,000 +
Unknown (not
a typical
protest rally,
but
underground
action and
movement)

100,000 +

General strike,
sit-ins, Coal
miner's strike

October 2,
2000

Kolubara
Mines, then
nationwide

General strike,
sit-ins,
Worker's strike

October 3,
2000

Nationwide

General strike,
sit-ins,
complete
country
shutdown

October 4,
2000

Nationwide

Nonviolent
Intervention:
Disruptive and
Creative; Protest
and persuasion,
and
noncooperation
Nonviolent
Intervention:
Disruptive and
Creative; Protest
and persuasion,
and
noncooperation
Nonviolent
Intervention:
Disruptive and
Creative; Protest
and persuasion,
and
noncooperation

Coal Miners,
DOS, and
Otpor!

Coal Miners,
DOS, and
Otpor!

Workers, DOS,
and Otpor!

General strike,
Nonviolent
sit-ins,
Intervention:
complete
Nationwide,
Workers, DOS,
Disruptive and
country
October 5,
but
Police/Military
Creative; Protest
shutdown,
2000
concentrated in
Forces, and
and persuasion,
including
Belgrade
Otpor!
and
official police
noncooperation
forces.
Note: Based on Collin (2009), Lazic (1999), Ramet (2005), and Schock (2004).
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Maximum
involvement,
mobilized
hundreds of
thousands,
many NGO's
involved,
provided
financial
resources,
transportation
of workers and
protesters into
Belgrade,
helped in
takeover of
Parliament and
TV/Radio
station, human
rights
organizations,
unions, and a
variety of other
civil society
institutions.

10,000 +

1,000 + per
city

1,000 + per
city

100,000 500,000 in
Belgrade,
thousands per
other cities

Appendix 5: Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern

Source: Keck, Margaret E. "Social Equity and Environmental Politics in Brazil: Lessons from the Rubber
Tappers of Acre," Comparative Politics 27 (July 1995): pp. 409-24.
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Appendix 6: Organization-to-organization ties in Poland, 1980-1981

Source: Osa, Maryjane. Solidarity and Contention: Networks of Polish Opposition. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 2003.
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